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ARTICLE 
A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO 
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION LAW 
Benjamin Means* 
 
According to standard law and economics, minority shareholders in 
closely held corporations must bargain against opportunism by controlling 
shareholders before investing.  Put simply, you made your bed, now you 
must lie in it.  Yet most courts offer a remedy for shareholder oppression, 
often premised on the notion that controlling shareholders owe fiduciary 
duties to the minority or must honor the minority’s reasonable expectations.  
Thus, law and economics, the dominant mode of corporate law scholarship, 
appears irreconcilably opposed to minority shareholder protection, a 
defining feature of the existing law of close corporations. 
This Article contends that a more nuanced theory of contract—freed from 
the limiting assumptions of standard law and economics—offers a 
persuasive justification for judicial protection of vulnerable minority 
shareholders.  Moreover, although courts often describe the shareholder 
relationship in fiduciary terms, contract theory provides a more coherent 
explanation of current doctrine.  The “contractarian” objection to 
shareholder protection poses a false choice between fairness and 
autonomy:  by enforcing the implicit contractual obligations of good faith 
and fair dealing, courts protect minority shareholders from oppression and, 
at the same time, advance the values of private ordering. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to standard law and economics, minority shareholders in 
closely held corporations must bargain for protection against opportunism 
by controlling shareholders before investing.1  Close corporations, after all, 
contain relatively few shareholders, lowering the cost of bargaining to 
manageable levels.2  Put simply, you made your bed, now you must lie in 
it.3 
 
 1. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 830 (2002) 
(“[P]arties who want liberal dissolution rights may bargain for them . . . before investing.”); 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 229 (1991) (“[I]t is essential to use contractual devices to keep people in a position to 
receive the return on their investment.”); Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of 
Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 221 (2004) (asserting that any 
interference by courts would “rewrite the contract and provide a windfall to the minority”); 
Larry E. Ribstein, The Closely Held Firm:  A View from the United States, 19 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 950, 955 (1994) (“[J]udicially-administered remedies threaten the security of the 
agreements the parties have made.”); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for 
the Omelet to Set:  Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 
24 J. CORP. L. 913, 915 (1999) (“[T]he question [is] what, if anything, the courts should do 
for the minority shareholders in cases where the parties have not provided for the problem by 
contract.  Our basic answer is that courts should not do anything except enforce the 
participants’ contracts and vigorously prevent non pro rata distributions to shareholders.”). 
 2. The shareholders can all fit around a bargaining table, and “[c]orporation statutes in 
all states now allow shareholders substantial freedom to modify the corporate adaptive rules 
by unanimous contractual agreement.” Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close 
Corporation Contract:  A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 242 (1992); 
see also Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. 
L. 377, 378 (1990) (same). 
 3. See Paula J. Dalley, Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder 
Activism, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 301, 320–21 (2008) (arguing that just as “Enron 
shareholder-employees made their own beds by failing to diversify their retirement account 
holdings . . . [t]he same is true of ‘oppressed’ shareholders in close corporations . . . who 
willingly (although perhaps unwisely) chose to invest as minority shareholders”). 
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Yet, courts in most jurisdictions reject a narrowly contractual view of 
shareholder relationships and offer a remedy for shareholder oppression in 
closely held corporations, often premised on the notion that controlling 
shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the minority or must honor the 
minority’s reasonable expectations.4  Thus, law and economics, the 
dominant mode of corporate law scholarship,5 appears irreconcilably 
opposed to minority shareholder protection, a defining feature of the 
existing law of close corporations.6 
This Article contends that the “contractarian”7 objection to shareholder 
oppression doctrine is wrong for two principal reasons.  First, the objection 
rests upon a false premise; according to standard economic theory, a 
rational shareholder will always bargain at arm’s length for adequate 
protection before agreeing to invest in a closely held corporation.8  In 
reality, small business investors are not always sophisticated, founding a 
business is an inherently hopeful act, and fellow investors are often family 
members or friends.  It should come as no surprise, therefore, that investors 
often fail to anticipate and bargain against future oppression, especially 
regarding problems that may not surface until later generations assume 
control of the business.  The rational actor model of human behavior bears 
at most an approximate relation to reality.9 
Second, even someone who reliably perceived and rationally pursued 
whatever advanced her own self-interest might fall victim to oppression as a 
minority shareholder.  If this hypothetical, economically rational investor 
hoped to negotiate all points at arm’s length before investing, she would 
soon confront the cruel reality of transaction costs.  Bargaining takes time 
 
 4. See John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority 
Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657 (2007) (surveying state 
law); Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts:  Is the 
Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1002 (2001) (observing 
that “courts have increasingly used [reasonable expectations analysis] to determine whether 
oppressive conduct has taken place”).  For a latecomer to the party, see McLaughlin v. 
Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 150 (Utah 2009), which held in a case of first impression that 
minority shareholders are owed a fiduciary duty of “utmost good faith.” 
 5. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation:  An Introduction to the 
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 129, 142 (2003) (“[T]here is no dispute that law and economics has long been, and 
continues to be, the dominant theoretical paradigm for understanding and assessing law and 
policy.”). 
 6. Only two states have definitively rejected special protection for minority 
shareholders. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379–81 (Del. 1993); Richards v. 
Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). 
 7. By “contractarian,” I mean those who “view corporate law as simply a modest 
extension of contract law.” John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in 
Corporate Law:  An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1619 (1989). 
 8. See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains:  The Normative Structure of Contract 
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1871 (1991) (“Because it is generally feasible for the 
small number of shareholders in a close corporation to bargain among themselves, one view 
of the appropriate hypothetical bargain . . . would leave these questions to express 
contract.”). 
 9. As discussed infra Part III, the rational actor is a figment of abstract economic 
models. 
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and costs money; even if an investor has plenty of both, and thinks added 
clarity is worth the bother, there is a limit to what can be effectively dealt 
with ahead of time.10  Also, social relationships matter, and rational 
shareholders may prefer to rely on trust—without which a small business 
venture would never be attempted—even when explicit contractual 
solutions are available.11 
In a long-term contract rife with gaps that a party can exploit to further its 
own interests at the expense of the other parties to the agreement, the 
possibility of bad-faith opportunism12 is ever-present and robust judicial 
monitoring seems not only helpful, but necessary.13  The serious question is 
thus not whether to protect minority shareholders, but how to do it.  This 
Article contends that courts need not (and should not) apply a free-floating 
norm of fairness, judged after the fact, to resolve shareholder disputes.  
Courts that instead protect all shareholders’ reasonable expectations by 
enforcing well-established, equitable principles of contract, including the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,14 facilitate private ordering.  
Shareholders can invest without undue fear of ex post opportunism or 
judicial revision of the terms of the bargain.15 
 
 10. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 108 (2010) (“[C]lose 
corporation owners often either lacked the foresight to plan for the breakdown of their 
relationship, or could not easily figure out how to balance the dangers of freeze-in against 
the risk that a member would use a power to dissolve the corporation to oust a comember.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1805 (2001) (“The 
phenomenon of trust behavior suggests . . . that sometimes participants in closely held 
corporations may deliberately choose not to draft formal contracts, even when they could do 
so.”). 
 12. Opportunism involves more than economic self-interest.  According to one scholar, a 
party acts opportunistically if it “behaves contrary to the other party’s understanding of their 
contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement’s explicit terms, leading to a transfer 
of wealth from the other party.” Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of 
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1981).  Opportunism implies an element of bad faith. 
See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 834 
(2002) (contending that opportunism requires “bad faith exploitation of uncertainty”); 
O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 222 (“Opportunistic actors seek to extract an advantage which 
would be denied them if the party with whom they deal had full information.”). 
 13. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1620 (arguing that in “long-term contracting . . . judicial 
involvement is not an aberration but an integral part of such contracting”).  Coffee describes 
judicial monitoring as a “key tradeoff” in that “we counterbalance contractual freedom with 
ex post judicial review.” Id. at 1620–21.  For a related argument, see Thompson, supra note 
2, at 394 (“A close corporation is like a long-term relational contract in which benefits for all 
parties necessarily depend on unstated assumptions.  A fully contingent contract cannot be 
drafted, so some ex post settling up by courts is used to support these assumptions.”).  This 
Article builds on Coffee’s and Thompson’s helpful analyses of the judicial role but resists 
the notion that there is a necessary tradeoff to be made.  Although the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is mandatory, its purpose is to protect the parties’ bargain, not to restrict the 
permissible subject matter of the bargain. 
 14. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied as a mandatory term in all 
contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
 15. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 166 (“[C]ontrolling shareholders should not have 
fiduciary duties to noncontrolling shareholders . . . . [T]he law need only constrain 
opportunism by holding the controller to its express or implied contractual obligations, 
including the duty of good faith . . . .”).  Even though Professor Ribstein takes a relatively 
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This Article’s central contention is that a more nuanced theory of 
contract—freed from the limiting assumptions of standard law and 
economics—offers a persuasive justification for judicial protection of 
vulnerable minority shareholders in close corporations.  Moreover, although 
courts often describe the shareholder relationship in fiduciary terms, 
contract theory provides a more coherent explanation of current doctrine.  
In short, the contractarian objection to shareholder protection poses a false 
choice between fairness and autonomy.  By instead enforcing the implicit 
contractual obligations of good faith and fair dealing, courts can protect 
minority shareholders from oppression and, at the same time, advance the 
values of private ordering. 
Part II briefly describes the problem of minority shareholder oppression 
in close corporations and sets forth the standard law and economics 
objection to judicial intervention.  According to this view, shareholder 
relationships in a close corporation are defined by contract (including the 
contractual choice of business form).16  Using the familiar “nexus of 
contracts” theory of the firm,17 law and economics scholars advance two 
claims:  (1) that shareholder investment decisions can best be understood 
via the rational actor theory of choice, which posits that people act to 
maximize their self-interest, however they may define it;18 and (2) that 
courts should enforce the parties’ explicit bargain (including any 
background rules of corporate law) to avoid inefficient meddling with 
private ordering.19 
Part III argues that the rational actor theory underlying the contractarian 
view offers a not-merely simplified but shoddy description of decisions 
made by close corporation shareholders, especially in family corporations.  
More recent behavioral economic theory, grounded in cognitive 
 
narrow view of equitable protection, given the parties’ ability to protect themselves through 
explicit contract, this statement of principle seems exactly right.  Indeed, as discussed infra 
Part V, disagreement concerning the scope of equitable contract offers a locus for 
constructive engagement between law and economics and more progressive legal 
approaches.  Instead, a lingering and calcified dispute between “contractarian” and “anti-
contractarian” perspectives on corporate governance appears to have blocked progress 
toward a consensus concerning shareholder oppression law. 
 16. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 229. 
 17. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 8 (“[T]he corporation is not a thing, but rather a 
web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations . . . .”). 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 23 (“[N]eoclassical economics is premised on rational choice theory, 
which posits an autonomous individual who makes rational choices that maximize his 
satisfactions.”); AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY & FREEDOM 26 (2002) (“It must, however, be 
accepted that despite the limited reach of the self-interest approach to rationality, it is widely 
used not only in economics, but also in ‘rational choice’ models in politics and the 
increasingly important subject of ‘law and economics.’”); John Ferejohn, Rationality and 
Interpretation:  Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England, in THE ECONOMIC 
APPROACH TO POLITICS 279, 281 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 1991) (“[R]ational choice 
theorists are committed to a principle of universality:  (all) agents act always to maximize 
their well-being as they understand it . . . .”). 
 19. See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 
GA. L. REV. 363, 395 (2003) (“As long as this choice relies on contracts between parties who 
are motivated to act in their own interests, bargain freely, and internalize the costs and 
benefits of the deal, enforcing contractual choice produces ‘Pareto’ wealth maximization.”). 
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psychology, helps to explain why shareholders systematically fail to do 
what the rational actor theory predicts.20  Like the rest of us, shareholders in 
close corporations are imperfectly rational and tend to underestimate the 
likelihood of future strife.21 
Part IV contends that a narrow focus on the terms of the shareholder 
bargain fails to account for transaction costs and misses the substantial 
benefit of social norms that encourage cooperation and trust.  As law and 
economics scholars concede, shareholders cannot bargain in advance 
concerning every specific issue that might arise.22  Nor would shareholders 
necessarily want to tie their hands in advance.23  The alternative contractual 
approach—allocating general control rights ex ante—causes as many 
problems as it solves, because minority veto and majority fiat can both be 
used opportunistically to extract a disproportionate share of the 
investment.24  Moreover, some issues that might be addressed satisfactorily 
pre-investment may be left open on purpose; close-corporation shareholders 
may deliberately avoid extensive contractual negotiation to preserve the 
trust that makes the business form desirable in the first instance.25 
Part V shows that equitable principles of contract can accommodate the 
needs of investors committing to a long-term relationship as shareholders of 
a corporation.  In particular, the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied 
in every contract gives courts an appropriate method for resolving 
shareholder disputes in close corporations.  Contract theory, in fact, better 
explains existing shareholder oppression doctrine than does the imprecise 
invocation of fiduciary duty.  Rather than settle for simplified and 
 
 20. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).  For an argument “that economic analysis has failed to 
produce an ‘economic theory’ of contract law,” see Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Contract Law After Three Decades:  Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003).  
Professor Posner observes that “[t]he premises of economics push in the direction of 
freedom of contract . . . [a]nd yet courts do not always enforce the terms of contracts.” Id. at 
842.  Indeed, “[t]hey often refuse to enforce terms that seem . . . oppressive . . . .” Id.  
Moreover, normative economic analysis relies on models that are either too simple to be 
useful in the real world or else too complex to provide determinate guidance. Id. at 880. 
 21. Behavioral economics supports what scholars have long observed. See, e.g., F. 
Hodge O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders:  Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 121, 124 (1987) (“Unfortunately the atmosphere of optimism and goodwill 
which prevails during the initial stages of a business undertaking usually obscures the 
possibility of future . . . conflicts . . . .”). 
 22. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 34 (“Even when they work through 
all the issues they expect to arise, [venturers] are apt to miss something.  All sorts of 
complexities will arise later.”). 
 23. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 225 (“[W]hile contractual specification of rights and 
duties may provide protection against opportunistic withdrawal, the parties may also incur 
significant costs from lost flexibility.”). 
 24. See, e.g., id., at 239 (contending that rational investors will select the corporate form 
when they “attach greater value to the firm’s adaptability . . . and to elimination of the risk of 
shirking or opportunistic use of withdrawal rights by a minority shareholder than to the value 
of guaranteeing a minority shareholder’s right to continue as an employee, to share ratably in 
the firm’s profits, or to withdraw money capital”). 
 25. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1807 (“[A]ttempts to use contracts in 
relationships in which trust plays a central role can prove counterproductive and promote 
exactly the sort of opportunistic behavior they were intended to discourage.”). 
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unsatisfying assumptions, contract theory incorporates asymmetries, 
incompleteness, and relational rather than discrete exchanges.26  The law 
and economics refrain, “you made your bed, now you must lie in it,”27 is a 
pithy but empty phrase.28 
The standard law and economics argument gains little force when recast 
as a choice-of-form argument based on the availability of the LLC, a newer 
hybrid business form that combines certain features of partnership law with 
the limited liability of corporation law.29  If one doubts the ability of 
investors to bargain effectively in advance because of transaction costs, and, 
in many cases, family and other intimate connections, the same problems 
will arise in the LLC context.30  Despite their differences, LLCs and close 
corporations both involve long-term relationships and incomplete 
contractual bargaining; the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
should apply in either context to protect against opportunistic overreaching. 
I.  THE CONTRACTARIAN OBJECTION TO SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 
The predicament of the minority shareholder in a closely held corporation 
is easily stated.  A corporation’s board of directors, elected by a majority of 
the shareholders, has the sole authority to decide whether to issue dividends 
and what salaries to pay managers and employees; moreover, courts 
traditionally refuse to second-guess business decisions made by corporate 
managers.31  Thus, using established mechanisms of corporate governance, 
controlling shareholders can exclude minority shareholders from any role in 
the corporation.32  Minority shareholders are particularly vulnerable to 
 
 26. See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 2 (2005) 
(stating that “much of the existing theory of long-term or dynamic contracting was 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s” and that “[t]hese notions . . . complete the foundations 
for a full-fledged theory of the firm and organizations”). 
 27. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little?  Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335, 346 (2007) (identifying in 
corporate law “a basic principle, captured by the colloquialism ‘you made your bed, now you 
have to lie in it’”). 
 28. If we want to take the metaphor seriously, we should observe that there are many 
people involved in making the bed, the bed frame cannot really be adjusted, and the people 
who may eventually find that the bed is uncomfortable may not even be born yet. 
 29. See infra Part V.C. 
 30. See Sandra K. Miller et al., An Empirical Glimpse into Limited Liability Companies:  
Assessing the Need To Protect Minority Investors, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 609, 613 (2006) 
(“[M]inority LLC investors tend to be more vulnerable than their close corporation 
counterparts.”); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company:  
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 896 
(2005) (“[T]he problem of oppression is ‘portable’ to the LLC context, as the LLC shares 
certain core features of the close corporation.”). 
 31. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 242 (“[T]he business judgment rule says that 
courts must defer to the board of directors’ judgment absent highly unusual exceptions.”). 
 32. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations:  Of 
Change, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717, 717 
(2002) (stating that “oppression doctrine combats majority shareholder efforts to exclude a 
minority investor from the company’s financial and participatory benefits”); D. Gordon 
Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 309 n.153 (1998). 
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these “freeze-out” techniques, because they cannot sell their shares and 
therefore have no other way to earn a return on their investment.33 
The standard law and economics rejoinder to the alleged problem of 
shareholder oppression is also easily stated.  According to this view, courts 
should restrict their focus to the parties’ actual bargain, including the choice 
of business form, and should not provide any special protection to minority 
shareholders in close corporations.34  Shareholders, majority or minority, 
who want a different deal have every incentive to negotiate for it and can be 
assumed to act rationally in their own best interests.35 
A.  You Get What You Bargain For 
Those who oppose minority shareholder protections argue that regardless 
of the sympathy that courts may feel for minority shareholders trapped in an 
investment gone sour,36 there is no justification for the imposition of 
fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders.37  As one scholar puts it, 
“Controlling stockholders’ fiduciary duties are a judicial invention 
stimulated by a desire to provide relief to minority stockholders who later 
regretted their own or their decedent’s bargains and encouraged by scholars 
advocating a neo-marxist view of investing.”38  Like any other contract, the 
parties’ ex ante agreement should control. 
The argument assumes, of course, that contract theory explains corporate 
law.  Notably, law and economics scholars reject the traditional 
corporation-as-person metaphor39 and contend that the corporation is better 
understood as a nexus of contracts among various constituencies, including 
shareholders, directors, officers, and employees.40  This “contractarian 
 
 33. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 3:1, at 3–2 (rev. 2d ed. 2005); O’Neal, supra note 21, 
at 126 (“[D]ischarge of the shareholder-employee often produces an immediate financial 
crisis for him.”); see also Brooks v. Hill, 717 So. 2d 759, 765 (Ala. 1998) (“[B]ecause of the 
minority shareholder’s prospect of being cut off from corporate income and privileges, the 
plight of a minority shareholder in a close corporation, as distinguished from both a partner 
in a partnership and a minority shareholder in a publicly traded corporation, is unique.”). 
 34. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency 
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273 (1986) (“[T]here is no reason to believe that shareholders 
of either closely or publicly held corporations will be more or less ‘exploited.’  No a priori 
case can be made for greater legal intervention in closely or publicly held corporations.”). 
 35. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 798 (“Investors would be foolish to agree to invest 
in the business, but leave planning details about the firm until the future.  Instead, they 
should settle the critical questions in advance . . . .”). 
 36. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993) (“It is not difficult to be 
sympathetic, in the abstract, to a stockholder who finds himself or herself in that position.”). 
 37. See Dalley, supra note 1, at 176 (“[B]asic principles of corporate and agency law, 
properly understood, provide all the protection stockholders need and provide a more 
workable framework for evaluating stockholder behavior.”). 
 38. Id. at 222. 
 39. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 8 (“Despite the utility of the fiction of corporate 
legal personhood, it is critical to remember that treating the corporation as an entity separate 
from the people making it up bears no relation to economic reality.”). 
 40. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law:  A Generation 
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 779–80 (2006) (“The core innovation of the theory was to 
conceptualize the relationship between managers and shareholders of a public company as 
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model [has] cemented its hold on corporate law scholarship . . . .”41  By 
focusing upon contract, rather than the public dimension of corporate law, 
the metaphor emphasizes private ordering.42  According to the logic of 
private ordering, corporation law should provide default principles for the 
parties to accept or modify.43 
To see why standard law and economics places such strong emphasis on 
the parties’ freedom to negotiate, it is important to understand the 
underlying theory of human behavior.  When parties enter into a contract, 
they cannot know what the future will hold.44  They must evaluate and 
allocate risk, including unforeseen risk.45  Any theory of contract must 
explain how the parties will (or should) respond to uncertainty.46 
B.  Rational Choice Theory 
According to standard law and economics, the rational actor model of 
decisionmaking can predict a contracting party’s evaluation of contractual 
uncertainty.47  A rational actor takes into account all available information 
and picks the best means of accomplishing her goals.48  Thus, “[s]tandard 
 
one of contract—a ‘corporate contract’—in which joint wealth would be maximized . . . .”); 
cf. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 6 (2004) (“As an 
economic entity, a firm fundamentally serves as a nexus of contracts:  a single contracting 
party that coordinates the activities of suppliers of inputs and of consumers of products and 
services.”). 
 41. Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law, 
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 796 (2002). 
 42. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 8 (“Nexus of contracts theory has pervasive 
implications, both descriptively and normatively, for our understanding of the corporation.”); 
Thompson, supra note 2, at 378 (observing that mandatory constraints are inconsistent with 
the nexus of contract theory). 
 43. Whatever its merits as a normative claim, the characterization of corporate law rules 
as default settings is a highly selective one. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of 
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (1989) (observing that corporations 
consist of rules, some determined by “contract or other forms of agreement” and 
“[s]ome . . . determined by law”). 
 44. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211, 213 (1995) (“Contracts concern the future, and are therefore always 
made under conditions of uncertainty.”). 
 45. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. 
L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981) (noting that “contract rules serve as . . . risk allocations”). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 213.  For a discussion of rational actor theory, see 
JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR:  MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 191–213 (2007).  Professor Elster summarizes rational choice theory as follows:  
“An action is rational . . . if it meets three optimality requirements:  the action must be 
optimal, given the beliefs; the beliefs must be as well supported as possible, given the 
evidence; and the evidence must result from an optimal investment in information 
gathering.” Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted). 
 48. See Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (1998) (noting law and economics “assumption that 
individuals choose rationally” and without any systematic biases); see also Eisenberg, supra 
note 44, at 213.  As Professor Eisenberg explains, the rational actor theory assumes: 
that individual decisionmakers can compute (subjective) probability estimates of 
uncertain future events; that they perceive accurately the dollar cost or outcome of 
the uncertain outcomes; that they know their own attitudes toward risk; that they 
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economics assumes . . . that we are cognitively unhindered in weighing the 
ramifications of each potential choice.”49  To be rational, one must act upon 
adequate information to maximize one’s own perceived utility 
unencumbered by relationships with other people and free of any other 
cognitive biases or limitations.50 
Although rational actor theory is sometimes understood to require 
relentless selfishness, it applies to means, not ends, and can accommodate 
socially-motivated preferences for charity as easily as a self-interested 
desire for personal gain.51  Rational choice theory takes all preferences as 
given, so long as they are internally consistent.52  Thus, even if law and 
economics tends to assume self-interested behavior, economic analysis can 
accommodate the fact that human beings are social animals and not 
motivated exclusively by self-interest.53  The mechanism for doing so—
 
combine this information about probabilities, monetary values of outcomes, and 
attitudes toward risk to calculate the expected utilities of alternative courses of 
action and choose that action that maximizes their expected utility. 
Id. (quoting Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 
HAMLINE L. REV. 385, 386 (1989)). 
 49. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 239 (2008).  Professor Ariely observes, 
“even if we make a wrong decision from time to time, the standard economics perspective 
suggests that we will quickly learn . . . either on our own or with the help of ‘market 
forces.’” Id. 
 50. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) 
(contending that individuals “maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and 
accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets”).  
The rational choice vision can be described as a kind of modern stoicism: 
This is the ideal of the disengaged self, capable of objectifying not only the 
surrounding world but also his own emotions and inclinations, fears and 
compulsions, and achieving thereby a kind of distance and self-possession which 
allows him to act ‘rationally’. . . .  Reason is no longer defined in terms of a vision 
of order in the cosmos, but rather is defined procedurally, in terms of instrumental 
efficacy, or maximization of the value sought, or self-consistency. 
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:  THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 21 (1989). 
 51. On a stricter view of neoclassical economics, an individual values “payoffs to other 
individuals only insofar as these influence his own payoff.” Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis, 
Human Motivation and Social Cooperation:  Experimental and Analytical Foundations, 33 
ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 45 (2007) (stating that “experimental evidence . . . rejects the selfishness 
assumption routinely made in economics”); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1808 
(criticizing law and economics by citing “extensive empirical evidence” that “most people 
shift readily from purely self-interested to other-regarding modes of behavior depending 
on . . . social context”). 
 52. Rational choice theory accommodates plainly irrational desires. See, e.g., SEN, supra 
note 18, at 39 (pointing out that if someone decides to cut off his toes, rational choice theory 
would decide whether or not he is rational by examining whether he has selected a sharp 
enough knife).  But the rational actor theory does not purport to be a full account of human 
reason.  For instance, many people drive because they “have an irrational fear of flying.” 
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1551, 1554 (1998).  They “want above all to avoid being killed; yet they choose the more 
dangerous mode anyway.” Id.  Posner asserts, however, that “[a] preference can be taken as 
a given, and economic analysis proceed as usual, even if the preference is irrational.” Id.  
Although irrationally afraid of airplanes, nervous flyers still respond to changes in ticket 
price when choosing whether to drive or fly. Id. at 1559 n.16. 
 53. Although some economists continue to assume that individuals act to maximize self-
interest, “[t]he discrepancy between the traditional theory and experimental results has 
driven several economists to develop a theory of ‘social preferences’ that incorporates 
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describing other-oriented motives in terms of the actor’s own personal 
utility—is ungainly but perhaps serviceable. 
However, if we cannot look behind the preference to address whether or 
not it is rational—as might be possible if we could evaluate preferences 
against a narrow conception of self-interest—then we cannot know whether 
a vulnerable minority shareholder has behaved irrationally.  Without 
substantive constraints on rational choice, we can always construct a 
preference that the contractual arrangement serves.  This creates two related 
difficulties. 
First, if we identify individuals’ preferences by working backward from 
their choices, then the rational actor model is tautological.54  The definition 
of rationality excludes unsuitable governance arrangements.55  As the 
Delaware Supreme Court has stated, “The tools of good corporate practice 
are designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to 
bargain for protection before parting with consideration.”56  Because 
rational minority shareholders would take reasonable steps to protect the 
value of their investment, the controlling shareholders’ conduct, if within 
the bounds of the agreement, is not oppression.  On this view, courts should 
not interfere with voluntary agreements to provide benefits unavailable 
through negotiation.57 
Second, because rational choice theory takes all preferences as a given, 
law and economics scholars cannot claim that corporate law rules are well 
designed to serve wealth-maximizing goals in the close corporation context.  
This inherent limitation is easy to overlook.  Judge Frank H. Easterbrook 
and Professor Daniel R. Fischel, for example, note that there are a variety of 
business forms available and conclude that “[a]t the margin the problems 
must be equally severe, the mechanisms equally effective—were it 
otherwise, investors would transfer their money from one form [of 
 
preferences for other-regarding behavior . . . .” Mizuho Shinada & Toshio Yamagishi, 
Bringing Back Leviathan into Social Dilemmas, in NEW ISSUES AND PARADIGMS IN 
RESEARCH ON SOCIAL DILEMMAS 93, 94 (A. Biel et al. eds., 2008).  For a recent critique of 
economic theories that focus upon self-interested choice, see Ronald J. Colombo, Exposing 
the Myth of Homo Economicus, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 737 (2009) (reviewing MORAL 
MARKETS:  THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008)). 
 54. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 54 (“Trying to explain [a] choice by 
its . . . consequences is a form of ‘rational-choice functionalism’ . . . that sheds no light on 
the meaning of the behavior.”); Ferejohn, supra note 18, at 281 (“Rational choice 
theory . . . constructs explanations by ‘reconstructing’ patterns of meanings and 
understandings (preferences and beliefs) in such a way that agents’ actions can be seen as 
maximal, given their beliefs.”). 
 55. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 805, 808 (2000)  (“[I]f actors always act rationally in their own self-interest, then, in 
the absence of fraud, duress, or the like, all bargains must be fair.”). 
 56. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993).  In that regard, well-advised 
shareholders ought to consider the feasibility of buy-sell agreements and long-term 
employment agreements to supplement the basic corporate documents. 
 57. Dalley, supra note 1, at 221 (“Where a controlling stockholder bargains for control, 
the courts should not rewrite the contract and provide a windfall to the minority.”); see 
Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380 (“It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our 
corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed 
stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not contracted.”). 
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ownership] to the other until the marginal equality condition was 
satisfied.”58  But this is true only if shareholders invest across business 
forms solely to maximize expected profits.  To the extent participation in a 
closely held corporation reflects other values—for instance, the desire to 
participate with friends and family in a shared venture—then we can no 
longer assume that the different business forms will produce similar 
financial returns and that their governance problems are equivalent.59 
The central problem with the contractarian objection to shareholder 
protection is not that it values rationality—we all want to be rational—but 
that it ignores the reasons why real-world bargaining among corporate 
investors often bears little resemblance to the simplified assumptions of 
standard law and economics.  The next part uses the insights of behavioral 
economics to explain why rational actor theory fails to describe shareholder 
relationships in close corporations. 
II.  THE PERSISTENCE OF IRRATIONAL CHOICE 
It is no secret that minority shareholders in close corporations tend not to 
bargain for adequate protection, a problem that has been evident for 
decades.60  Equally well-understood is that the statutory model of the 
corporation was designed with the public corporation in mind.61  Yet the 
rational actor theory cannot account for uncorrected flaws in the corporate 
model.62  After all, a perfectly rational minority shareholder would always 
negotiate for adequate protection, demand a discount commensurate with 
the risk of loss through majority opportunism, or decline to invest.  Unless  
 
 58. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 231. 
 59. See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority 
Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1234 (2009) 
(“[P]articipating in a close corporation may represent a fundamental life choice, a 
commitment to work together with family or friends to build a business consistent with their 
values.”); Susan Clark Muntean, Analyzing the Dearth in Family Enterprise Research, in 
DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH IN FAMILY BUSINESS 3, 6 (Phillip H. Phan & John E. 
Butler eds., 2008) (“Rational-legal models of the firm typically are silent on the role trust 
and altruism flowing from family ties and networks play[s] in decision making and choice of 
organizational structure.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Moll, supra note 30, at 907 (“[C]lose corporation shareholders typically 
fail to engage in advance planning and fail to contract for protection from dissension.”); 
O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 243 (“Available evidence suggests that relatively few closely held 
corporations adopt such contractual devices.”); O’Neal, supra note 21, at 124 (“Important 
arrangements among participants in small business enterprises are often oral and sometimes 
nothing more than vague understandings, never even definitely stated orally.”). 
 61. See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of 
Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 265–66 (2008); see also ROBERT CHARLES 
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 762 (1986) (“[C]entralization of management . . . has proven most 
troublesome in the close corporation context.”).  Professor Clark observes that “the standard 
model . . . makes good economic sense for public corporations” but works less well for close 
corporations as “the shareholders will also expect to be actively engaged in helping to form 
and implement the corporation’s business decisions, and they will want to be compensated as 
officers or employees.” Id. 
 62. See Posner, supra note 20, at 865 (“The economic scholarship on contract law 
purports to assume that individuals are rational in the sense of neoclassical economics.  Their 
preferences obey certain consistency requirements, and their cognitive capacity is infinite.”). 
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the close corporation form offered an equal return on investment at the 
margin, a rational investor would say no.63 
This part contends that the rational choice assumptions of standard law 
and economics are unhelpful as a way of understanding the predicament of 
the minority shareholder or the doctrinal responses that have evolved.64  
Behavioral economics offers a more compelling account of minority 
shareholders in close corporations. Admittedly, integrating empirical 
observation and cognitive psychology complicates the picture of human 
behavior and does not lend itself to grand synthesis, but the law should 
value accuracy over elegance. 
A.  Behavioral Economic Evidence 
Behavioral economics starts from the premise that “economics [would] 
make a lot more sense if it were based on how people actually behave, 
instead of how they should behave.”65  By empirically testing assumptions 
about rationality, behavioral economists have demonstrated what common 
sense had long suggested—people are not as rational as the rational actor 
model assumes and depart systematically from its formal requirements.66  
Thus, “[o]ur irrational behaviors are neither random nor senseless—they are 
systematic and predictable.”67 
For example, although it is not economically rational, owners tend to 
think their possessions are worth more than non-owners do (the 
“endowment effect”) and have a strong aversion to loss.68  In one study, 
Duke University students who had entered a lottery for basketball tickets 
subsequently assigned a different dollar value to the tickets, depending on 
whether they won or lost the lottery, even though the value of the 
experience of attending basketball games should have remained the same.69  
Experimenters found that “the students who did not own a ticket were 
 
 63. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 231 (“Because the world contains so 
many different investment vehicles, none will offer distinctively better chances of return 
when people can select and shift among them.”). 
 64. See Posner, supra note 20, at 865 (“If individuals were rational, with no cognitive 
limits, and if transaction costs were zero, the role of contract law would be simple and 
uninteresting.”). 
 65. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 239; see also ELSTER, supra note 47, at 67 (“To 
understand how people act and interact, we first have to understand how their minds work.”). 
 66. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 239 (defining behavioral economics as “an emerging field 
focused on the (quite intuitive) idea that people do not always behave rationally and that they 
often make mistakes in their decisions”); Jon Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously:  The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 
(1999) (“For the past few decades, cognitive psychologists and behavioral researchers have 
been steadily uncovering evidence that human decisionmaking processes are prone to 
nonrational, yet systematic, tendencies.”). 
 67. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 239 (“We all make the same types of mistakes over and 
over, because of the basic wiring of our brains.  So wouldn’t it make sense to modify 
standard economics and move away from naive psychology, which often fails the tests of 
reason, introspection, and—most important—empirical scrutiny?”). 
 68. Id. at 129. 
 69. Id. at 133 (“From a rational perspective, both the ticket holders and the non-ticket 
holders should have thought of the game in exactly the same way.”). 
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willing to pay around $170 for one.”70  But “[t]hose who owned a ticket. . 
.demanded about $2,400 for it.”71  More than 100 students were contacted; 
not one student “was willing to sell a ticket at a price that someone else was 
willing to pay.”72 
The behavioral economics literature is vast, but the point is simple:  we 
are not always effective at perceiving and advancing our own self-interest.73 
(A moment’s introspection should suffice to confirm the truth of this 
statement).  If shareholders in close corporations are subject to the same 
predictable cognitive biases, then the law and economics objection to 
shareholder protection rests upon false assumptions.  The objection clings 
to a narrow and implausible conception of rational choice, despite empirical 
evidence that human decisionmaking departs considerably from the formal 
model, in predictable, systematic fashion.74 
Behavioral economics has clear implications for our understanding of 
close corporation shareholders.75  Although a rational actor would not 
overestimate the value of family bonds or fail to give appropriate weight to 
all possible future outcomes, close corporation shareholders, as humans, are 
susceptible to systematic cognitive errors. 
1.  Disposition Bias 
As shown by the fact that “[n]early ninety percent of drivers believe they 
drive better than average,” it is clear “that as a systematic matter, people are 
unrealistically optimistic.”76  Perhaps more relevant to the launching of a 
 
 70. Id. at 132. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 9 (Penguin Books 2009) (2008) (“The false 
assumption is that almost all people, almost all of the time, make choices that are in their 
best interest or at the very least are better than the choices that would be made by someone 
else. . . .  [T]his assumption is false—indeed, obviously false.”). 
 74. Some law and economics scholars admit that the rational choice model does not 
capture actual decisionmaking, that shareholders are only “boundedly rational,” and that 
shareholders may even be subject to the predictable biases identified in the behavioral 
economics literature.  For a discussion, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 23–26.  However, it 
is not enough to posit that law and economics is akin “to Newtonian physics” and that 
corporate rules are simple falling objects for which more sophisticated models are 
unnecessary. Id. at 26.  The concession that people are not rational in the formal economic 
sense leaves no adequate explanatory mechanism. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 26 
(contending that rational choice theorists cannot rely on the analogy to “Newton’s theory” 
because “[t]here is no general nonintentional mechanism that can simulate or mimic 
rationality”) (emphasis omitted).  Professor Bainbridge may nevertheless be right that 
standard “economics adequately explains the behavior of large masses of people engaged in 
exchange.” BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 26.  Perhaps market forces supply the mechanism 
in those circumstances. Cf. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 26 (acknowledging possibility that 
“[s]ome kind of social analog to natural selection” might substitute for rationality “at least 
roughly”).  As discussed infra Part III.C, however, markets do not correct for irrational 
choice in close corporations. 
 75. See Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1465 (“[P]roblems of systematic error apply with 
special force to bargains concerning closely held corporations.”). 
 76. Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 216. 
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business venture are surveys of individuals who are about to get married, 
showing that while “respondents correctly estimated that fifty percent of 
American couples will eventually divorce” they “estimated that their own 
chance of divorce was zero.”77 
Thus, disposition bias may cause investors to overvalue the likely success 
of a venture and to underestimate the risk of conflict.78  Even if potential 
investors understood, as a general matter, that business ventures fail and 
that family relationships falter, they might not apply that insight to their 
own situation.  Moreover, although a rational actor would gather the 
optimal amount of information before making a final decision, optimism 
may cause investors to look for information that reinforces their existing 
belief.79 
2.  Cognitive Bounds 
Shareholders may also fail to protect themselves against the possibility of 
oppression because they cannot process information perfectly, as the 
rational choice model requires.  This discrepancy between the ideal and the 
actual is sometimes called “bounded rationality.”80  For example, minority 
shareholders may “give too little weight to future benefits and costs as 
compared to present benefits and costs.”81  Similarly, shareholders may 
misjudge the risk of low-probability, unpleasant outcomes.82  Even when 
 
 77. See id. at 217 (citing Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship 
Is Above Average:  Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993)). 
 78. See id. (“[W]hen people rate their chances for personal and professional success, 
most unrealistically believe that their chances are better than average.”); Sean Hannon 
Williams, Sticky Expectations:  Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, 
Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 733 (2009) 
(“Most people underestimate the likelihood that they will experience negative events and 
overestimate the likelihood that the law will protect them if those events occur.”). 
 79. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 158 (“The agent initially forms an emotion-induced 
bias, and the urgency of emotion then prevents her from gathering the information that might 
have corrected the bias.”). 
 80. See William J. Carney, The Theory of the Firm:  Investor Coordination Costs, 
Control Premiums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 59–60 (1987) (“Investors in 
closely held enterprises are likely to be subject to conditions of bounded rationality, under 
which they either fail to perceive the complete set of problems that may occur later, or 
underestimate the probability of their occurrence.”); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, 
Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 17 (2009) (defining “bounded rationality” 
as “a somewhat malleable term that includes an inability to negotiate future plans because 
parties ‘have to find a common language to describe states of the world and actions with 
respect to which prior experience may not provide much of a guide.’” (citation omitted)). 
 81. Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 222 (contending that, as a consequence of their “faulty 
telescopic faculty” people systematically misjudge their future preferences) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also ELSTER, supra note 47, at 224 (defining the “inability to 
project” as “the lack of ability to imagine what oneself or others would have reasons to 
believe, or incentives to do, in future situations that depend one’s present choice”). 
 82. See Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 223 (“Related to actors’ faulty telescopic faculties is 
the systematic underestimation of risks.”).  Professor Eisenberg cites “empirical evidence . . . 
that people often not only underestimate but ignore low-probability risks.” Id.  On the other 
hand, people may dramatically overestimate unlikely events that are “available” (like 
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they modify default rules, shareholders may do so in ways that fail 
rationally to advance their own interests. 
For example, in Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.,83 two 
brothers (and their respective families) had equal control over the profitable 
Demoulas supermarket chain.84  When one of the brothers died, the 
surviving brother assumed full control of the business.85  He later used that 
power to squeeze out his brother’s family, reserving most of the benefits of 
ownership for himself.86  It apparently had not occurred to the brothers to 
take steps to prevent the surviving brother from misappropriating the value 
of the business.87  Quite the opposite, they had entered into a voting trust 
agreement that gave unchecked authority to the surviving brother, expecting 
that each would take care of the family of the predeceased.88 
The implications of behavioral economics research for law remain 
unsettled,89 but for our purposes, it suffices that shareholders in close 
corporations are unlikely to behave like homo economicus.  Unless we take 
the brute force view that “eventually they’ll learn,” a contract theory based 
on a false description of human behavior is just not terribly useful.90 
B.  Contesting the Implications of Irrational Choice 
Law and economics scholars may respond to the findings of behavioral 
economics by contending that markets and lawyers will correct for any 
serious departures from rational choice on the part of individual investors, 
that behavioral economics lacks theoretical coherence and offers no clear 
lessons, and that, even assuming human beings do not always measure up to 
an economist’s vision of rationality, corporate law should remain oriented 
 
terrorism) while paying insufficient attention to more likely but less salient risks—like flu 
and dehydration. See id. at 223–24. 
 83. 677 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1997). 
 84. Id. at 165.  The business was established by their parents as “a neighborhood food 
store” in 1917. Id. 
 85. Id. at 165–66 (describing operation of voting trust agreement that vested sole voting 
power in the hands of the surviving brother). 
 86. Id. at 166. 
 87. This may also be an example of “disposition bias.” 
 88. Through the voting trust agreement, the parties not only failed to consider the 
possibility of oppression, but actually sought to eliminate legal protections they otherwise 
would have enjoyed. Id. at 171 (describing restrictions on shareholder litigation built into the 
trust agreement).  Of course, trust agreements impose specific fiduciary responsibilities; 
arguably, the parties bolstered their fiduciary obligations contractually, using trust law to 
supplant corporate law protections.  Although permitting the plaintiffs to sue for breach of 
the trust agreement may have best honored the terms of the contract, the court found the 
shareholder litigation restriction void as against public policy. Id. at 172. 
 89. See generally Arlen, supra note 48. 
 90. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 810–11 (“[E]xpected-utility (rational-actor) theory 
‘emerged from a logical analysis of games of chance rather than from a psychological 
analysis of risk and value.  The theory was conceived as a normative model of an idealized 
decision maker, not as a description of the behavior of real people.’” (quoting Amos Tversky 
& Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, at 
S251 (Supp. 1986)). 
2010] SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION LAW 1177 
toward rational behavior.  These objections, however, are speculative and 
undermined by the available evidence. 
Although markets are sometimes offered as a corrective for individual 
cognitive errors, they seem unlikely to play that role in a close corporation: 
Any plausible theory of effective market discipline in corporate law 
generally rests on some combination of the following:  an efficient capital 
marketplace that prices both good and bad corporate governance with 
reasonable precision; compensation of key insiders using stock or options, 
so as to better align the interests of managers and investors; the emerging 
power of institutional investors who can actually threaten to exercise their 
voting rights; and a reasonably active market for corporate control.91 
Unlike a public corporation, where the stock price will, in theory, impound 
all available information, even though individual investors may lack the 
information or the ability to process it, close corporation stock does not 
trade actively.92  Because the market is illiquid, there is no established 
market price for close corporation stock and no market for corporate 
control.93  Other markets may be useful—for instance, the employment 
market that indicates the salary a shareholder could command by working 
for a different business—yet those markers provide only rough guidance 
and have little bearing on the problem of oppression.94  Also, close 
corporation shareholders often have investment goals that are more 
complex than simple profit maximization.95 
Alternatively, because business investment decisions are not often made 
lightly and may involve the assistance of counsel, we might insist upon 
rational behavior from participants in a business venture, even though we 
 
 91. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual 
Funds:  Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1031 (2005). 
 92. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations:  The Unanswered 
Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 759 (2000) (“By definition . . . there is no 
ready market for the stock of a close corporation.”). 
 93. Although the divergence of interest of managers and investors is less serious in close 
corporations, because investors typically run the corporation directly, that alignment of 
interest does not reduce the incentive of controlling shareholders to take a disproportionate 
share of corporate profits. See Michael Carney, Corporate Governance and Competitive 
Advantage in Family-Controlled Firms, 29 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 249, 250 
(2005). 
 94. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 233 (“There can be no presumption 
that those who have invested equal amounts are entitled to equal salaries as managers.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, Family Loyalty Anchors Ford in Risky Times, N.Y. TIMES, June 
23, 2009, at A1. 
  Ford is still losing money—$1.4 billion in the first quarter alone—and its cash 
reserves are shrinking as auto sales have dried up for the entire industry.  Even so, 
Ford family members said they could not envision any situation that would cause 
them to sell out.  
  “If this were just a financial investment, the family probably would have been 
out of it years ago,” Bill Ford said.  “This is very much an emotional 
commitment.”  Although Ford Motor Company is publicly traded, the descendents 
of its founder, Henry Ford, are the controlling shareholders.  
Id. 
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would make allowances for human frailty elsewhere.96  However, “many 
close corporation participants are ill-advised or unsophisticated and so may 
not anticipate” dissension.97  Lawyers may not be involved or, because of 
cost concerns, have only a peripheral role.98  Further, even excellent 
lawyers cannot anticipate all future events, and the fundamental tension 
between preserving flexibility and constraining opportunism will remain. 
For some law and economics scholars, the questionable choice to put all 
one’s eggs in a single basket must nevertheless be consistent with rational 
choice.99  The argument is tautological because it assumes what is at issue:  
whether a concentrated investment decision will be made carefully.  Indeed, 
if anything, the decision to tie up a substantial percentage of one’s wealth in 
a close corporation may itself be evidence of a departure from economic 
rationality.100  Even though some shareholders are quite sophisticated—
venture capital firms, for instance, approximate the rational-actor model 
when making investment decisions and bargain for control rights in 
exquisite detail—the law’s basic structure should protect unsophisticated 
investors who are unlikely to protect themselves.101  Indeed, the ranks of 
the relatively unsophisticated often include business entrepreneurs who 
seek venture-capital financing.102 
 
 96. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 237 (“The attorney is a specialist 
provider of information; questions that never occur to the parties have been addressed and 
solved long ago by others, and attorneys transmit this accumulated expertise.”). 
 97. Charny, supra note 8, at 1872. 
 98. See O’Neal, supra note 21, at 124 (“[E]ven if the participants foresee the possibility 
of future dissension, they are reluctant to call in and pay the costs of legal counsel to provide 
against contingencies.”).  Not all lawyers have the requisite expertise to help close 
corporation shareholders negotiate appropriate, tailored provisions. See Judd F. Sneirson, 
Soft Paternalism for Close Corporations:  Helping Shareholders Help Themselves, 2008 
WIS. L. REV. 899, 916 n.92 (“[S]ome attorneys who do not specialize in business planning 
may not appreciate the need for [minority shareholder] protections or be able to 
professionally draft them.”).  A lawyer who advises all participants may fail to protect the 
interests of each participant.  Moreover, as sales of self-incorporation books indicate, many 
corporations are formed without legal advice. See id. at 916–17. 
 99. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 237 (“Investors in close corporations 
often put a great deal of their wealth at stake, and the lack of diversification (compared with 
investors in publicly held firms) induces them to take care.”). 
 100. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held 
Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1109 (1999) (“Holding stock in a closely held 
corporation, viewed purely as an investment decision, seems almost irrational from an 
economic perspective.”). 
 101. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989) (“[I]f the majority is more 
likely to contract around the minority’s preferred default rule (than the minority is to contract 
around the majority’s rule), then choosing the minority’s default may lead to a larger set of 
efficient contracts.”).  Admittedly, the choice of more protective default rules “involves 
imposing costs of drafting opt-out agreements on some transactors to protect other 
transactors who would not have the sophistication or good judgment to insist by contract on 
the protections that they automatically receive under a more protective regime.” Charny, 
supra note 8, at 1872.  However, venture capital firms can reuse previously drafted 
agreements, thereby reducing the cost. 
 102. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in 
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 975 (2006) (“[W]e doubt that many entrepreneurs are well 
advised and fully informed when contracting with VCs . . . .”); Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal 
2010] SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION LAW 1179 
Nor does it follow that bargained-for protections indicate, by negative 
implication, that other protections must not have been considered 
valuable.103  Even when the parties do negotiate, certain issues will be 
easier to anticipate and address, and their relative simplicity bears no 
obvious relation to their importance.  For instance, in many cases “[v]oice 
matters to minority shareholders not only as a procedural protection, but 
often as, in itself, a central benefit of the investment.”104  Yet the closest 
analogue—a long-term employment agreement—does not fully capture the 
minority’s interest in having a voice in the business and raises other 
problems for the controlling shareholders.  As one commentator observes, 
“[I]nvestors in a near-the-margin closely held corporation would be 
unlikely to grant minority investors a contractually fixed right to continued 
employment and to a predetermined share of profits.”105  By contrast, 
restraints on share alienability designed to limit ownership to agreed 
members may not be considered critical, yet such restraints are relatively 
simple to conceive and implement. 
Even conceding that irrationality impacts decisionmaking and is not 
reliably cured by other market forces or by lawyers, some may object that a 
list of departures from rationality falls short of a theory of behavior.106  It 
takes a theory to beat a theory.107  But behavioral economics demonstrates 
that cognitive errors are systematic, not random, and bases its observations 
on a theory of mind.  Whether behavioral economics counts as an 
 
Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival:  A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed 
Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 100 (“[T]he manner by which an entrepreneur collects and 
interprets facts about the contractual context, as well as the way that she uses these facts to 
construct her beliefs and plans, will be affected in significant ways by the tendency of 
entrepreneurs to be over-optimistic.”). 
 103. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 238 (rejecting “ignorance” 
explanation for exclusion of shareholder protections by reference to commonly-included 
provisions such as “restraints on alienation” of shares). 
 104. Means, supra note 59, at 1213. 
 105. O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 244.  The problem with such guarantees is that they 
“undermine the adaptability of the team and create a risk of minority opportunism in the 
form of shirking, two problems that efficiency-minded joint owners . . . seek to avoid by 
choosing corporate form instead of partnership form.” Id. 
 106. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 7 (“In itself, irrationality is just a negative or residual 
idea, everything that is not rational.  For the idea to have any explanatory purchase, we need 
to appeal to specific forms of irrationality with specific implications for behavior.”); Arlen, 
supra note 48, at 1768 (“[E]ven when people are not rational, behavioral analysis of law 
cannot necessarily provide an alternative framework for developing normative policy 
prescriptions because it does not yet have a coherent, robust, tractable model of human 
behavior which can serve as a basis for such recommendations.”); Adam Benforado & Jon 
Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash:  The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights, 
57 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1119 (2008) (“As soon as behavioralism began to gain some traction, 
many conventional legal economists denigrated the new approach for lacking a single, 
simple theory that could generate at-the-ready testable behavioral predictions.”). 
 107. See Posner, supra note 20, at 867 (“[One reason that] [e]conomists reject bounded 
rationality arguments . . . is methodological:  They cannot agree on a standard, 
mathematically tractable formulation of bounded rationality.”).  As Posner comments, “This 
might be a good reason for economists, but it is a bad reason for lawyers.” Id. 
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independent theory because it builds upon and does not wholly reject 
traditional economic analysis, the evidence cannot simply be ignored.108 
The objection that behavioral economics is too ad hoc to count as theory 
is further undermined by the tendency of standard law and economics to 
treat its own assumptions as non-falsifiable.109  For instance, one 
commentator dismisses the problem that people fail to plan for their future 
needs and instead over-indulge current consumption preferences 
(“hyperbolic discounting”) by postulating that human identity over time is 
not continuous.110  The present “self” choosing is not the same as the future 
“self” experiencing the consequences; the present “self” may rationally 
ignore the interests of that future person, who is a stranger, remote in time 
and space.111  Although the “‘multiple selves’ approach” is convenient (and 
could even be true), its after-the-fact interpolation diminishes the integrity 
of rational-choice theory and its pretension to scientific explanation.112  
Moreover, if this is what rational choice means, why would we defer to it?  
To the extent people cannot order their affairs into the future, a society that 
intends to preserve itself over time must make up for that deficiency.113 
However, a skeptic might also observe that behavioral economics 
sometimes fails to generate clear predictions.114  If there are multiple 
cognitive biases, and if those biases sometimes point in different directions, 
then who can say what role any particular bias may have on behavior?115  
Thus, behavioral economics cannot generate determinate answers to most 
questions.  But we do not need to separate each causal factor to understand 
 
 108. See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual 
Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 185 (1992) (“The assertion ‘it takes a theory to beat a 
theory’ is not strictly correct. A theory indeed may beat a theory.  Nothing, however, beats a 
theory like a practice, and reference to practice makes the pure contractual corporation 
untenable.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 52, at 1558–59 (asserting superior predictive power of 
simpler rational-choice model); id. at 1560 (“If a theory cannot be falsified, neither it nor its 
predictions can be validated . . . .”). 
 110. See id. at 1555 (“All the selves are rational but they have inconsistent preferences.”). 
 111. See id. 
 112. This problem also arises when rational choice theorists contend that any supposedly 
unselfish motivation for choice can be redescribed in terms of the personal utility gained by 
acting charitably or out of a sense of moral duty. See SEN, supra note 18, at 28 (critiquing 
“complex instrumentality” arguments).  It may be true that other-directed conduct serves 
hedonistic goals, but the assertion that it must do so is impossible to falsify and gives 
rational choice the ability to swallow any motive. 
 113. For an interesting argument that contractual commitments extend human identity 
over time, see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME:  A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT (2001). 
 114. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1487 (1998) (“A possible objection to our approach is that conventional 
economics has the advantage of simplicity and parsimony. At least—the objection goes—it 
provides a theory.”).  As the authors concede, “a behavioral perspective offers a more 
complicated and unruly picture of human behavior, and perhaps that picture will make 
prediction more difficult, precisely because behavior is more complicated and unruly.” Id. 
 115. See Arlen, supra note 48, at 1768; see also ELSTER, supra note 47, at 46 (“In 
general, the social sciences are not very good at explaining how causes interact to produce a 
joint effect.”).  Thus, “[t]he existence of an interaction effect may be subject to the same 
kind of indeterminacy that we find in mechanisms more generally.” Id. at 47. 
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that, collectively, they push shareholders away from the negotiation that the 
rational choice model predicts.  The multiplicity of causation counsels 
modesty in our efforts to explain human behavior and only reinforces the 
need to move past the stylized, rational choice model.116 
Still another version of the objection to behavioral economics might 
argue that if irrationality is part of being human, courts will be as prone to 
error as shareholders.117  Cognitive errors, however, depend on the actor’s 
situation, and a court will not be subject to the emotional attachments and 
over-optimism that may lead to a sub-optimal amount of bargaining in close 
corporations.118  To the contrary, we might worry that judges will succumb 
to “hindsight bias,” treating an event as highly probable or inevitable 
simply because it actually happened.119  If the eventual dispute appears to 
have been inevitable, then a court may conclude that the minority 
shareholder ought to have anticipated it.  In any event, it is not enough to 
claim that judges are imperfect—law and economics scholars must offer 
some reason to prefer non-ideal contracting to non-ideal judging, a burden 
they have not met. 
Nor does it derail the argument to acknowledge that majority 
shareholders, who have more invested and more to lose, are also subject to 
cognitive limitations.120  The point is not that a cunning majority dupes a 
guileless minority into investing without adequate protection—although 
information disparities and disparate power may sometimes produce that 
result.  Rather, shareholder oppression is a problem because the majority 
may later be tempted to act opportunistically or, in the event of family or 
corporate dissension, may wish to punish the minority.  When informal, 
cooperative dynamics falter, corporate law gives the majority the ability to 
get its way without the need for any substantial minority input, let alone 
support. 
Finally, there is the normative case for rational choice.  Despite our many 
failings, we “want to be rational” and “do not take pride in our lapses from 
rationality.”121  The behavioral economic critique demonstrates the flaws of 
rational choice as a predictive theory but “does not, in itself, provide 
 
 116. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 5, at 191 (“It is the economists who resist seeing 
or taking seriously what others are revealing, through the scientific method, about what 
moves us.  And they are doing so based on a theory that has been falsified (or is non-
falsifiable) and, which, therefore, is based, at bottom, on an evidence-blind intuition or 
faith.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2, at 391 (noting that in some situations “[i]t may be 
easier to anticipate, and therefore incorporate into price or otherwise bargain around, the 
selfish conduct of fiduciaries than to anticipate the conduct of judges and the monitoring and 
error costs associated with judicial decisions”). 
 118. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1622 (“From its ex post perspective, a court can more 
easily determine if opportunistic advantage has been taken of the minority.”). 
 119. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in 
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998). 
 120. There may well be circumstances where enforcement of the literal terms of an 
agreement—for instance, opportunistic use by the minority of a buy-sell provision—produce 
inequitable results for majority shareholders. 
 121. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 164. 
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grounds for questioning the formulation of rationality.”122  However, a 
more capacious definition of rationality is possible; rather than reduce 
rationality to the maximization of self-interest, we might, for example, 
characterize it as the “discipline of subjecting one’s choices—of actions as 
well as objectives, values and priorities—to reasoned scrutiny.”123  This 
definition could include within the ambit of rationality socially motivated 
reasons for choice and choices dictated by a sense of moral duty.124  In the 
close corporation context, those additional considerations might involve a 
sense of family obligation, honesty, and fairness.125 
C.  The Limits of Institutional Design 
An advantage of the behavioral economic perspective is that it 
encourages creative solutions to enable human beings to act in accordance 
with their own self-interest and to overcome their cognitive limitations.126  
For example, recognizing that “[a]ctors systematically give too little weight 
to future benefits and costs as compared to present benefits and costs,”127 
 
 122. SEN, supra note 18, at 29. 
 123. Id. at 4; see also Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Rational Actor Theory, Social 
Norms, and Policy Implementation:  Applications to Administrative Processes and 
Bureaucratic Culture, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO POLITICS 237, 237 (Kristen Renwick 
Monroe ed., 1991) (“The principal alternative [to rational actor theory], the communitarian 
approach, argues that behavior is driven primarily by commonly shared values . . . which are 
internal to a society and which have value and meaning . . . within the social context in 
which behavior takes place.”).  Although socially motivated reasons for choice might be 
described in self-interested terms—for instance, the self-satisfaction one feels after a 
charitable donation—choice cannot be reduced to those terms without serious loss of 
meaning. SEN, supra note 18, at 26 (“[T]he point is that these broader values are not ruled 
out on the ground that they lack reason and would be irrational to entertain (unless justified 
by some underlying complex instrumental connection that makes them selfishly 
beneficial).”). 
 124. See SEN, supra note 18, at 28 (contending that rational choice theory “has denied 
room for some important motivations and certain reasons for choice, including some 
concerns that Adam Smith had seen as parts of standard ‘moral sentiments’ and Immanuel 
Kant had included among the demands of rationality in social living (in the form of 
‘categorical imperatives’).”); see also ELSTER, supra note 47, at 227 (“Acting on the 
categorical imperative is . . . irrational.  Rationality tells me to choose as a function of what 
will happen if I do A rather than B.”).  Consequently, to be rational, choices “have to be 
reinterpreted . . . within the format of intelligent pursuit of self-interest” and “[t]his has given 
the explanatory role of [rational choice theory] an almost forensic quality, focusing on the 
detection of hidden instrumentality . . . .” SEN, supra, at 28.  Professor Sen concludes 
caustically:  “[t]hings, it is darkly hinted, are not what they seem (or at least seemed to 
simple-minded observers like Smith or Kant).” Id. at 29. 
 125. I do not mean to suggest that courts should enforce altruistic behavior under the 
guise of rationality, only that the meaning of rationality need not be artificially constricted so 
that anything that does not maximize an individual’s self-interest cannot count as rational.  
The normative desirability of reason should not weigh for or against protection of minority 
shareholders. 
 126. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 232 (“If we understand our propensity to make 
mistakes, we can and do take precautions to make us less likely to make them again, or at 
least limit the damage if we do.”); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 73, at 11–13 (describing 
goal of choice architecture:  “Choosers are human, so designers should make life as easy as 
possible.”). 
 127. Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 222. 
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we might automatically enroll employees in a retirement savings plan while 
allowing them to opt out.128  Employees would remain free to decide 
according to their own preferences, but would receive a “nudge” in what 
(for the vast majority of people) is the right direction.  Because such 
proposals second-guess individuals’ own choices while leaving them free to 
make the final decision, Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler use 
the label “libertarian-paternalism” to acknowledge the seeming 
contradiction.129  Recently, some scholars have applied these insights to 
close corporation law.130 
However, solving the problem of shareholder oppression requires more 
than a “nudge” for three principal reasons.  First, unless there is a clear right 
answer, we cannot choose helpful default settings.  Unlike the obvious and 
near-universal benefits of tax-deferred savings plans, a rational investment 
in a close corporation will depend upon the specific circumstances.  For 
instance, some minority shareholders might benefit from mandatory 
distribution of profits as dividends in order to prevent freeze outs, while 
others—if they contemplated working for the business—might prefer to 
negotiate long-term employment contracts with specified salaries.131  The 
two strategies could be combined; alternatively, a rational shareholder 
might prefer to leave corporate managers with maximum flexibility.  Since 
multiple approaches are appropriate in different contexts, what would we 
“nudge” people to do?132 
Second, even if we concluded that certain default rules would benefit 
minority shareholders, we would have to measure that benefit against 
potential costs.  For instance, a rule requiring the distribution of dividends 
 
 128. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 73, at 12. 
 129. See id., at 4–5. 
 130. See, e.g., Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or at Least Understand Why 
You Should):  Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce 
Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 496 (2009) 
(contending “that statutes governing both corporations and LLCs should require all owners 
to read several warnings about the dangers of a lack of advance planning before starting a 
business . . . [and] that ‘form’ agreements and provisions protecting minority interests should 
be widely available, either as freely available standard ‘template’ agreements or . . . default 
provisions in statutes”); Sneirson, supra note 98, at 901–02 (“By redesigning state 
incorporation forms to so ‘nudge’ parties to protect themselves against later minority-
shareholder oppression . . . secretaries of state and others can . . . encourage those likely to 
need such protection to elect it, while allowing more sophisticated incorporators to easily 
and cheaply opt out.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E. 2d 657, 662 (Mass. 
1976) (“A guaranty of employment with the corporation may have been one of the ‘basic 
reason[s] why a minority owner has invested capital in the firm.’” (quoting Symposium, The 
Close Corporation, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 345, 392 (1957))). 
 132. Professor Sneirson suggests that do-it-yourself manuals should also advise 
incorporators to enter “shareholder agreements that guarantee the original investors seats on 
the company’s board, employment with the company, and dividends (perhaps according to a 
formula).” Sneirson, supra note 98, at 928.  He is right to counsel that self-help books on 
incorporation should include discussion of shareholder oppression issues, but it is unclear 
whether his specific recommendations would improve corporate governance in most close 
corporations.  Mandatory board and employment rules limit a corporation’s flexibility, and 
dividend requirements limit the ability to commit substantial resources to the business and 
create a risk of shirking.  There are tradeoffs involved, and the optimal mix will vary. 
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could later hamstring the corporation’s ability to reinvest funds, or, in 
adverse business environments, to retain extra operating capital.133  
Additionally, even if advantageous in the abstract, a default rule might need 
too much tailoring to accomplish its purpose.  For instance, if we reasoned 
that in a world without transaction costs most rational investors would 
bargain for a right to sell their stock, we might decide to create a default 
right of exit.134  However, one-size-fits-all exit provisions135 may only 
encourage opportunism.  If the accompanying valuation mechanism is set 
too low, it creates an incentive for controlling shareholders to freeze out 
minority shareholders and force a buy out.136  If the valuation is too high or 
the method of valuation is itself particularly burdensome, the right of exit 
could encourage minority shareholder opportunism.137 
Third, it might be objected that even useful default settings cannot 
substitute for mandatory rules, and that the Sunstein and Thaler model 
could undermine existing shareholder protections.138  For instance, 
Professor Judd Sneirson uses the model to propose heightened duties owed 
among shareholders as a default setting, leaving the parties free to reject 
those responsibilities.139  Although the argument presumes that 
 
 133. Of course, such issues can be addressed through detailed negotiation and, for some 
corporations, the benefits of mandatory distribution will outweigh the costs. See, e.g., Galler 
v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964) (enforcing shareholder agreement that conditioned 
payment of annual dividends, inter alia, on maintenance of $500,000 surplus).  The point is 
that, when any number of policies are equally plausible and highly context dependent, it will 
be difficult for a benevolent lawmaker, armed with the latest behavioral economic research, 
to establish a useful default setting. 
 134. See, e.g., Dalley, supra note 1, at 198 (observing without endorsement that “the law 
might contain default rules similar to those selected by sophisticated investors”); Matheson 
& Maler, supra note 4, at 691. 
 135. See Means, supra note 59, at 1252–54. 
 136. For example, in Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), three 
brothers were shareholders in a close corporation and entered into a stock retirement 
agreement (SRA) intended to guide the purchase of one shareholder’s stock by the others if 
that shareholder wanted to leave the business or else upon his death.  The SRA valued each 
share of stock at only “75% of net book value at the end of the preceding calendar year,” id. 
at 800, and this low valuation may have motivated two of the brothers to fire the third. See 
id.  The purchase price dictated by the SRA was $563,417.67 lower than the fair market 
value later awarded by the court after finding that the two brothers had acted oppressively. 
Id. at 802. 
 137. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 226 (noting that a strong exit right “exposes team 
members to the risk of loss from opportunistic threats to withdraw”). 
 138. Under existing law, parties may “bargain over structural and distributional rules,” 
but they cannot waive fiduciary duties. See Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1469. 
 139. Sneirson contends that “[w]ith a few simple changes, states’ (typically) one-page 
incorporation forms can be made to encourage protection for those minority shareholders 
most likely to need it without imposing on those shareholders and businesses most likely not 
to need it.” Sneirson, supra note 98, at 901.  Incorporators would have to “opt out if they do 
not want to owe one another heightened . . . fiduciary duties.” Id. at 919–20.  For a related 
argument that courts should enforce fiduciary norms as default terms, see Charny, supra note 
8, at 1872: 
Occasions for opportunistic distribution of gains from the enterprise arise in an 
enormous array of situations that may be difficult to anticipate via contract terms.  
Given the complexity of the requisite provisions, it would seem to be substantially 
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shareholders systematically depart from rational choice—which is why they 
need a “nudge”—it does not explain how the default rule would reduce the 
likelihood of cognitive error.140  Unless some level of protection is 
mandatory, trusting and optimistic shareholders may be induced to abandon 
it at the outset of the venture.141  On the other hand, courts routinely enforce 
unwise contractual bargains, and an explicit decision to waive certain 
protections is not an oversight; it is a specific choice.142 
In sum, we can perhaps ameliorate—but cannot hope to solve—the 
problem of shareholder oppression by changing default rules.  The next part 
further establishes the need for a strong judicial monitoring role to remedy 
shareholder oppression by explaining why, even if shareholders were 
entirely rational in a formal, economic sense, it would be unrealistic to 
expect them to bargain in advance for protection against all variants of 
opportunism. 
III.  ACCOUNTING FOR INCOMPLETE BARGAINS AND SOCIAL NORMS 
The contractarian objection to shareholder oppression doctrine posits that 
rational shareholders bargain for necessary protections before investing in a 
 
cheaper to imply a strong set of background duties and permit individual 
transactors to draft opt out provisions. 
 140. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1469 (“[B]argains to relax materially the fiduciary 
rules set by law would likely be systematically underinformed even over the short term.”).  
Thus, “[a]ny such waiver would therefore inevitably permit unanticipated opportunistic 
behavior.” Id. at 1470. 
 141. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?  A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 572 (1990) (“[G]iving close corporations the power to 
dispense with the duty of loyalty would be troublesome.”).  Although Professor Black favors 
enabling rules that parties can modify, he acknowledges that “[t]he casebooks are full of 
situations where . . . trust proved to be misplaced” in close corporations. Id.  Consequently, 
“a fully enabling regime may be inefficient.” Id. at 573.  Absent mandatory protection, the 
“instances of abuse will likely increase.” Id. at 572.  Similarly, Professor Coffee contends 
that some fiduciary norms should be mandatory and that any permitted “departures from the 
default rules of fiduciary duty must be sufficiently specific and bounded to permit the 
departure to be accurately priced.” Coffee, supra note 7, at 1624. 
 142. Courts, of course, may demand clear evidence that a choice to waive fiduciary 
protection has been made.  Recent Delaware case law suggests that courts will not lightly 
find a waiver.  Under Delaware’s LLC law, as amended in 2004, LLC members may choose 
to eliminate all fiduciary duties. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2005).  For such a waiver 
to be enforceable, however, the Delaware courts have required that it be unmistakably clear. 
See, e.g., Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658, 2009 WL 
1124451, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (“[T]he interpretive scales also tip in favor of 
preserving fiduciary duties under the rule that the drafters of chartering documents must 
make their intent to eliminate fiduciary duties plain and unambiguous.”) (citations omitted).  
To the extent that honoring the parties’ decision to waive fiduciary duties leads to wealth-
reducing outcomes, then autonomy and welfare conflict, and law and economics scholars 
have to justify why we should care about rational choice.  However, as discussed infra Part 
V, this Article contends that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every 
contract gives courts a powerful tool for addressing shareholder oppression disputes 
consistent with a robust view of private ordering.  In addition, courts can reject bargains that 
are unconscionable. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, 
and Accomodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 221–23 (2000) (arguing that the doctrine of 
unconscionability does not require paternalism, because the enforcement of contracts 
involves community standards that are not within the power of the parties to alter). 
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close corporation.143  Yet, even if we made the heroic assumption that 
shareholders are rational actors and immune to cognitive biases, transaction 
costs would prevent complete bargaining.144  Therefore, according to law 
and economics scholars, investors save time and money by selecting the 
form of business organization that supplies the most suitable general terms.  
Those terms then become part of the contractual bargain,145 while 
unsuitable ones are jettisoned or modified.146  In a shareholder dispute, 
then, courts should treat the background rules of corporate law as part of the 
parties’ agreement.147  If courts must supplement the bargain, they should 
aim to supply for the parties what they “would have bargained for had they 
anticipated the problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance.”148 
This part contends that the standard law and economics response to 
incomplete bargaining is inadequate, because it attaches too little 
importance to courts as gap-filling mechanisms.  First, background 
corporate law rules govern all types of corporations and may be unsuitable 
for close corporations.149  Also, a business form may be selected for tax 
planning purposes or other reasons unrelated to governance.150  Because 
transaction costs apply to the modification of default rules as well as to 
drafting contracts ab initio, we cannot simply assume that the parties will be 
able to afford the cost of bargaining around problematic default rules. 
Second, because corporate governance rules allocate the right to make 
future decisions to the board of directors, which is elected by a majority of 
 
 143. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 392 (“A close corporation provides more direct 
opportunity for specific private ordering because there exists no large-numbers problem that 
can lead to free rider questions or rational apathy.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Charny, supra note 8, at 1819 (“In almost all transactions, it would be 
extremely costly to draft a contract that purported explicitly to address the obligations of the 
parties for all conceivable future contingencies.”); Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1090 
(same); Posner, supra note 20, at 833 (“A theoretically complete contract would describe all 
the possible contingencies, but transaction costs—including the cost of negotiating and 
writing down the terms—and foreseeing low-probability events, render all contracts 
incomplete.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183 (2004). 
 146. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1090 (“If the basic risk allocation provided by a 
legal rule fails to suit the purposes of particular parties, then bargainers are free to negotiate 
an alternative allocation of risks.”). 
 147. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 216 (“If consensus is not possible, then the close 
corporation contract’s gap-filling processes will come into play.”).  O’Kelley states that 
“[t]he close corporation contract assigns primary gap-filling authority to majority 
shareholders . . . .” Id.  This authority includes the ability to “discharge a minority 
shareholder from the corporation’s employ” as well as “policies concerning payment of 
dividends, redemption of shares, or compensation of shareholder-employees.” Id. at 216 n.2.  
The contract leaves only “secondary, discretionary gap-filling authority to courts.” Id. at 216. 
 148. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 34. 
 149. See, e.g., DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, THE LAW OF CLOSELY HELD 
CORPORATIONS 1-1 (2009) (“[S]hareholders in closely held corporations often expect to run 
their businesses in ways that differ dramatically from traditional corporation norms—norms 
that are generally designed to serve the needs of publicly held corporations.”). 
 150. LLCs are an increasingly popular choice of form because firms can readily “adopt 
corporate-type terms such as free transferability, perpetual life, and centralized management 
without subjecting themselves to the corporate double tax . . . .” RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 
131. 
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the shares eligible to vote, even a matter entirely outside the contemplation 
of the parties at the time of investment would not fall into a contractual gap.  
This adaptive capacity is a virtue of corporate law but seems to leave little 
room for courts to protect minority shareholders from oppression at the 
hands of the majority.  If courts adopted the narrow view of their role that 
law and economics scholars advocate, rational parties would be forced to 
mistrust corporate law’s sensible, if rough, control rules and add layers of 
costly negotiation.151 
Third, trust and social bonds are hallmarks of the closely held business, 
and rational shareholders may choose not to bargain at arm’s length when 
doing so could endanger the social norms that drive the business.152  
Judicial monitoring, in short, deserves to be a primary—not merely 
secondary—response to the problem of transaction costs. 
A.  Transaction Costs and Gap Filling 
Corporations have an unlimited lifespan, and shareholders cannot 
practicably bargain for a fully specified, long-term contract.153  Thus, 
economically rational investors will often prefer to live with an incomplete 
bargain, addressing problems later, if and when they arise.154  To the extent 
the parties rationally choose to leave some questions unanswered, however, 
the gap-filling mechanisms they select (or that the law supplies) become an 
important part of their agreement.155 
 
 151. See Charny, supra note 8, at 1820 (“Correlatively, once the parties know that the law 
will supply the term, they take that into account when calculating the benefits of drafting an 
express term.  Parties will not incur the costs of specifying the term if they suspect that 
courts will supply the appropriate term in any event.”); Coffee, supra note 7, at 1621 (“In 
drafting the corporate contract, lawyers rely less on the model form provided by legislature 
than on their expectation that courts will prevent either side from taking ‘opportunistic’ 
advantage of the other.”). 
 152. See ARIELY, supra note 49, at 78–83 (observing that some businesses have sought to 
foster social, rather than purely market relationships with their employees and, even, with 
their customers).  Ariely contends that “[i]f corporations started thinking in terms of social 
norms, they would realize that these norms build loyalty and—more important—make 
people want to extend themselves to the degree that corporations need today:  to be flexible, 
concerned, and willing to pitch in.” Id. at 83.  As Ariely concludes, “That’s what a social 
relationship delivers.” Id.  Whether it is rational for close corporation shareholders to rely on 
social norms instead of arm’s-length negotiation depends in part on whether courts can be 
expected to take an active role in monitoring disputes. 
 153. See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 26, at 36 (“[M]ost long-term contracts in 
practice are incomplete, in that they do not deal explicitly with all possible contingencies and 
leave many decisions . . . to be determined later.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 154. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 216 (“Viewed contractually, the typical closely held 
corporation is mostly gaps.”); see generally Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete 
Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988). 
 155. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
CORPORATE LAW 12, 13 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993) (“Although it is instructive and a great 
analytical convenience to assume that agents have the capacity to engage in comprehensive 
ex ante contracting . . . the condition of bounded rationality precludes this.”).  Consequently, 
“[t]he study of structures that facilitate gap filling, dispute resolution, adaptation, and the 
like . . . become part of the problem of economic organization.” Id. 
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According to law and economics scholars, rational investors meet the 
problem of incomplete bargaining first and foremost by adopting the form 
of business organization that best suits their needs.156  There are, after all, 
partnerships, limited partnerships, corporations, and LLCs, each with 
different governance rules.157  Distinct business forms reduce transaction 
costs by providing sets of coherent principles against which any further 
explicit bargaining can take place.158  In particular, different forms of 
business organization allocate the right to make decisions in the future.159  
By incorporating, investors give majority shareholders substantially 
unfettered discretion to decide questions that have not been negotiated ex 
ante.160  Finally, and solely as a residual matter, law and economics 
scholars contend that the role of efficiency-minded courts is to supply the 
contract terms that economically rational parties would have chosen under 
conditions of frictionless bargaining.161 
Unfortunately, choice-of-form analysis does not solve the problem of 
incomplete bargaining.  Unless we assume that a perfect choice exists for 
each prospective business, the most we can conclude is that the form 
selected by investors was, all things considered, better than the 
alternatives.162  Any choice may have significant drawbacks, and 
 
 156. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 145.  For a seminal work on transaction-cost 
economics and the theory of the firm, see R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 
386 (1937), reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 33 (1988). 
 157. For instance, partnership law provides a default rule for equal participation in 
decisionmaking, regardless of the relative amounts contributed to the enterprise. See 
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 202(a), 401(f) & (j) (1997).  Investors may also choose to be 
governed by the laws of any jurisdiction, regardless of where they intend to operate the 
business. 
 158. See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 2 (“[F]irms may lack the resources to deal 
expertly with multidimensional long-term contracting problems.  The availability of sets of 
default rules that fill the contracting gaps can be critical to these firms’ success.”). 
 159. See Posner, supra note 20, at 858 (noting that economic models of incomplete 
contracts “predict that contracts will contain descriptions not of ‘physical’ contingencies but 
of the bargaining procedures that parties must follow at the time of performance”). 
 160. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 242.  Of course, to the extent a particular 
jurisdiction offers a statutory or common law remedy for oppression, even if that provision is 
inconsistent with other corporate law rules, the thorough-going contractarian must concede 
that it is appropriate to apply that remedy, since the parties could have chosen to incorporate 
elsewhere. See generally Ribstein, supra note 19. 
 161. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 34 (“Corporate law—and in 
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in the blanks . . . with the terms 
that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to 
transact costlessly in advance.”); Coffee, supra note 7, at 1622 (“Under this approach, the 
parties will be deemed ex post to have consented ex ante to the term that would have been 
most rational for them to specify; in short, rationality implies consent.”); Juliet P. Kostritsky, 
Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World:  What To Do When 
Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. 
REV. 323, 342 (noting that the theory of transaction-cost economics holds that “courts should 
supply default rules that mimic what ‘similarly situated’ parties would have consented to 
absent transaction costs”).  
 162. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 218–19 (contending that logical choice-of-form 
decisions, at least for decisions based on internal governance needs, can be arrayed along a 
continuum from sole proprietorships to corporations depending on the need for adaptability 
and concerns about opportunism).  Indeed, one scholar contends that “the close corporation 
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transaction costs limit the parties’ ability to rectify problems to the extent 
that the parties are even aware of them.163  Thus, ordinary corporate law 
rules may not resemble what the parties would actually have negotiated for 
themselves.164  Indeed, substantial contrary evidence may exist concerning 
what the parties intended.165 
Nor will courts uphold the parties’ bargain by imposing the economically 
rational terms that hypothetical investors might have wanted.  First, the 
choice-of-form theory leaves little room for judicial gap filling of any kind; 
unmodified default rules are taken to embody the parties’ preferences.166  
Second, even if the court identifies gaps in the explicit bargain, inserting 
hypothetical terms based on economic theory may not reflect the parties’ 
actual understanding of their relationship.167  In fact, the assumption “that 
rational parties would agree ex ante on whatever provision maximized 
value, even if the resulting gains were to be unequally distributed,” is 
highly implausible.168  As Professor John Coffee explains, “Nothing that we 
know about the real world suggests that individuals are actually so risk 
neutral as to behave in a fashion that is indifferent to the distribution of 
gains and losses.”169  Moreover, in a close corporation, shareholders 
“typically invest their human capital along with their financial capital” so 
that “corporate decisions will affect the shareholders’ wealth other than 
through the value of the stock (which is difficult to determine in any 
event).”170  Consequently, we have little reason to expect shareholders to 
“agree that the corporation should maximize firm value without regard to 
risk or to the value of the shareholders’ other assets.”171 
Although the hypothetical contract approach purports to advance the 
parties’ own autonomy interests by helping them to avoid economically 
 
was an evolutionary dead end because the corporate form could not be a satisfactory vehicle 
for closely held firms.” RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 102. 
 163. See BECKER, supra note 50, at 7 (“The assumption that information is often seriously 
incomplete because it is costly to acquire is used in the economic approach to explain the 
same kind of behavior that is explained by irrational and volatile behavior . . . in other 
discussions.”). 
 164. See George S. Geis, Economics as Context for Contract Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
569, 597–98 (2008). 
 165. For example, in one fairly typical case the evidence indicated that, despite the 
background rule of at-will employment, the plaintiff “utilized his own funds . . . not simply 
as an investment, but to provide employment and a future for himself.” In re Dissolution of 
Wiedy’s Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (App. Div. 1985). 
 166. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1625 (observing that the hypothetical contract gap-
filling methodology requires “an omitted term” and yet, because corporate law establishes a 
“governance mechanism,” “the corporate contract may appear complete on its face”).  In the 
context of shareholder oppression, the default governance mechanism—majority rule—is 
precisely the problem. 
 167. See Bratton, supra note 108, at 192 (“Hypothetical contract is a welfare norm 
asserted by an academic.  It is not a transactional artifact.”). 
 168. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1623. 
 169. Id.  A court that focused only on overall wealth maximization “would ignore 
important issues of distributive fairness.” Id. 
 170. Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 141, 149 (2005). 
 171. Id. 
1190 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
irrational outcomes,172 it actually gets no closer to the parties’ real bargain 
than does the blanket imposition of fiduciary duties drawn from partnership 
law.  In assuming either that close corporation shareholders embrace 
partnership norms of behavior or instead that shareholders are driven to 
maximize wealth, a court is applying an “untailored” rule most people 
would supposedly choose, according to one or another theory, rather than 
seeking the “tailored” rule that the parties involved in the dispute would 
actually have wanted.173  We have no solid empirical basis for concluding 
that one approach better captures the preferences of close corporation 
shareholders than the other. 
As discussed infra in Part V, courts should instead seek to enforce the 
parties’ actual expectations, using equitable contract principles to evaluate 
available evidence concerning the parties’ bargain.174  Encouragingly, this 
seems to be the approach many courts follow, even when they describe the 
relevant duties in fiduciary terms.175  These courts’ analyses begin with the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation, by-laws, and any supplemental 
written shareholder agreements but encompass all material evidence of the 
parties’ understood bargain.176  The question of intent “is no trivial matter, 
as a great virtue of contract law lies in its flexibility and in the freedom of 
parties to make their own private laws.”177  Moreover, courts can 
potentially reduce overall transaction costs by deterring opportunism, thus 
 
 172. Cf. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 27 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 
Prometheus Books 1988) (1761) (arguing that liberty is not diminished by the social 
contract, even though “whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do 
so”).  According to Rousseau, “This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be 
free . . . .” Id.  Although a man loses “his natural liberty” through the social contract, he 
acquires “moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere 
impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is 
liberty.” Id. at 27–28.  Economic rationality might be viewed as such a law.  The relationship 
of rationality and freedom is deeply contested. See generally SEN, supra note 18.  For sharp 
criticism of Rousseau’s position, see generally ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in 
LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). 
 173. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 30 (distinguishing majoritarian default rules from 
tailored default rules); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 101, at 91 (same). 
 174. Professor Coffee argues that default rules should be established to force greater 
actual bargaining. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1623 (“The rationale for such a ‘coercive’ 
default rule is that it forces those possessing private information to disclose it to the 
market—and hence results in more accurate pricing.”).  While Coffee is right to observe that 
“hypothetical bargaining is inferior to actual bargaining,” see id., penalty default rules may 
be difficult to impose in close corporations, where shareholders often fail to bargain even 
when it would be economically rational to do so. 
 175. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146 (Utah 2009) (holding that 
termination of shareholder employee did not violate the majority’s fiduciary duty, because 
the employee’s stock holdings “were not inextricably tied to his employment; they were a 
separate investment in the company”); Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354 
(Mass. 1996) (holding that, despite strong fiduciary duties, “there was no evidence that . . . 
stockholders had expectations of continuing employment because they purchased stock”). 
 176. See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 149, § 7.01[D], at 7-68 to 7-70 (identifying key 
factors). 
 177. Geis, supra note 164, at 597–98 (observing that, in addition to efficiency 
justifications, intent is considered “fundamental to most philosophical arguments for 
upholding promises”). 
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encouraging small corporate ventures that might be stifled if the 
participants were forced to engage in expensive, protracted negotiations 
beforehand.178 
B.  The Power of Social Norms 
In addition to transaction costs that render the notion of complete 
contracting fictional, courts should also account for the bargain-limiting but 
socially beneficial phenomenon of interpersonal trust.179  If we believe that 
our fellow investors will treat us fairly regardless of whether they have a 
clearly defined legal obligation to do so, it may seem unnecessary to 
bargain carefully against future opportunism.180  Trust facilitates business 
relationships.  In a sense, social norms represent the sunny side of non-
rational choice.181 
When participants in a business enterprise feel personally invested, 
moreover, they show more loyalty and the willingness “to extend 
themselves to the degree that corporations need today:  to be flexible, 
concerned, and willing to pitch in.”182  If “[t]hat’s what a social relationship 
delivers,”183 then courts should be cautious about enforcing the logic of 
market transactions to such an extent that all considerations of trust among 
the parties become irrelevant. 
Even when market norms work adequately as motivation, they may be 
less efficient than social norms:  “Money, as it turns out, is very often the 
most expensive way to motivate people.”184  As one commentator observes, 
“It’s remarkable how much work companies (particularly start-ups) can get 
out of people when social norms (such as the excitement of building 
something together) are stronger than market norms (such as salaries 
stepping up with each promotion).”185  This is not to suggest that a close 
 
 178. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1624 (“[I]n the absence of certain judicially 
administered mandatory terms, such as a duty of good faith, the costs of contracting would 
be vastly increased, uncertainty would reign and litigation would become more likely.”); 
O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 247 (“[R]ational investors might predict that courts will exercise 
their equitable gap-filling powers to provide optimal governance rules to the parties ex post, 
thereby making ex ante contracting unnecessary.”). 
 179. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 229 (“The bond between parents and 
children, for example, constrains conflicts of interest.”).  Trust can substitute for more 
expensive contracting but “[i]t is . . . no accident that some of the famous cases dealing with 
closely held corporations involve situations where these informal bonds have broken down 
as a result of death, divorce, or retirement of the patriarch.” Id. at 229–30. 
 180. Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 137, 139 (2000) (“A substantial gap exists between the theoretical prediction that 
self-interested individuals will have extreme difficulty in coordinating collective action and 
the reality that such cooperative behavior is widespread, although far from inevitable.”). 
 181. See Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1760 (“Trust . . . can provide a motivation for 
players in a social dilemma to choose the optimal, cooperative outcome over the individually 
rational but suboptimal solution.”). 
 182. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 83. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 86; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 229 (observing that “familial or 
other personal relations” typical of close corporations “reduce[] agency problems”). 
 185. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 83. 
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corporation is or should be a non-market institution but simply a reminder 
that “[s]ocial norms are not only cheaper, but often more effective as 
well.”186 
If we value social norms, requiring shareholders to bargain for protection 
at their peril is not a recipe for preserving those norms.187  Indeed, in a 
business context, “to trust someone is to lower one’s guard, to refrain from 
taking precautions against an interaction partner, even when the other, 
because of opportunism or incompetence, could act in a way that might 
seem to justify precautions.”188  Under standard economic analysis, trust is 
irrational, and yet personal relationships among shareholders are critical to 
the success of the enterprise, lowering the cost of doing business.189 
By relying on trust rather than bargained-for protection, shareholders 
may even seek “to induce trustworthiness.”190  Assuming certain 
protections are feasible and not ruled out by transaction costs, a minority 
shareholder might nevertheless choose to do without those protections so 
that the other participants would understand that the relationship is one 
founded on trust.191  Experimental results indicate that this strategy works 
best when the other party is aware “that one has refrained from taking 
precautions that one might have taken.”192  This may in part explain why 
dissension occurs so often in the second or third generation, long after the 
founders have retired; trust may not be as transferable as stock.193 
 
 186. Id. at 86.  For an argument that trust may be valuable because untrustworthy people 
assume others are like them and will therefore avoid closely held businesses, see Blair & 
Stout, supra note 11, at 1804.  Of course, even if this is true, the next generation of owners 
will not benefit. See id. (contending that conflict “can be explained as a consequence of the 
fact that while the original founders of a closely held firm are subject to selective pressures 
that favor trust . . . their heirs and successors are not”). 
 187. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 395 (“Too much emphasis on the possible failure of 
the business is inconsistent with the positive effort necessary to establish the 
enterprise . . . .”); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1806 (“Suppose a potential 
business partner shows up armed with a lawyer and a ten-page contract loaded with fine 
print.  What does that behavior suggest?”). 
 188. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 344 (emphasis omitted). 
 189. See Krishnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts:  A Fresh Approach, 
10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 130–31 (1987) (stating that investors “incorporate with 
minimal fanfare, expecting that any subsequently discovered problem will be resolved 
amicably and reasonably”); see also MANFRED F.R. KETS DE VRIES & RANDEL S. CARLOCK 
WITH ELIZABETH FLORENT-TREACY, FAMILY BUSINESS ON THE COUCH:  A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 55 (2007): 
Many successful family businesses see such trust as a core organizational value, 
and design flexible organization structures to exploit it.  Conversely, publicly-
traded firms with short management tenures, especially at the top, often build 
structures that assume distrust, and design defensive controls to protect against 
self-serving behavior and conflicts of interest. 
 190. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 346 (emphasis omitted) (further observing that “[t]he idea 
of taking precautions might be incompatible with the agent’s emotional attitude toward the 
other person”). 
 191. See Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1805 (“The phenomenon of trust behavior 
suggests . . . that sometimes participants in closely held corporations may deliberately 
choose not to draft formal contracts, even when they could do so.”). 
 192. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 350. 
 193. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1804–05.  The implications are debatable.  Perhaps 
the minority shareholder who consciously adopts a trust strategy should have no legal 
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The social norm of trust operates in a “relational construct” and “cannot 
be explained in terms of simple economic rationality.”194  For standard law 
and economics, reliance on social norms makes sense only when transaction 
costs bar any other option.195  For instance, if the parties thought that a 
court would be likely to misconstrue their bargain in the minority’s favor, 
and if it were difficult for the majority to price this risk, the parties might 
prefer to live with the possibility of opportunism.196  Even so, the minority 
would eschew judicial protection only where private ordering and other 
market or reputational constraints offered a reasonable substitute.197 
Although irrational from the perspective of standard law and economics, 
trust can have powerful benefits.  Consider, for instance, the classic 
prisoner’s dilemma, in which two prisoners are isolated, and each prisoner 
is given the choice of implicating the other prisoner or staying silent.198  
The best coordinated decision would be to remain silent, but self-interest 
indicates that each prisoner should point the finger and hope that the other 
prisoner is foolish enough to stay silent: 
If the prisoners pursue their own individual self-interest “rationally,” they 
will end up with the worst possible outcome for both of them.  But they 
also can trust each other enough to accept the risk of retreating from their 
own immediate interest in favor of a common solution that will benefit 
 
recourse if it works out poorly.  Indeed, if we assume participants understand the law, 
background legal protection would seem to undermine the deliberate vulnerability that can 
encourage trustworthiness.  Or we might draw a more modest conclusion:  since conspicuous 
displays of trust can have a positive impact, and since intimate groups live on trust, we 
should hesitate before holding close corporation shareholders to the requirements of pure 
market rationality. 
 194. Michel Crozier, The Relational Boundaries of Rationality, in THE ECONOMIC 
APPROACH TO POLITICS 306, 308 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 1991).  We learn to trust 
each other over time, as when business participants have a pre-existing relationship. Id. at 
307 (“I trust John because over time I built a relationship that is strong enough for each of us 
to know the other will live up to his word.”). 
 195. Yet law and economics scholars have recognized that social relationships can reduce 
agency costs. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 229 (“Participants in closely 
held corporations frequently have familial or other personal relations in addition to their 
business dealings.  The continuous and nonpecuniary nature of these relationships reduces 
agency problems.”). 
 196. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 448 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., 
dissenting).  Of course, this assumes that the risk of opportunism can be valued more 
accurately than the risk of judicial error, a dubious assumption. See Thompson, supra note 2, 
at 402 (“[I]t seems unlikely that the parties would have agreed that, upon the occurrence of 
any disagreement, the majority shareholders would have the right to exclude the minority.  
That right could not have been effectively priced by the minority at the beginning . . . .”). 
 197. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 402 (arguing in favor of mandatory rule that waiver 
of fiduciary protections is irrational because “there are no other alternative checks” on 
majority opportunism). 
 198. See Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas:  The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 183, 186 (1998) (“What defines the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the relative value of the four 
outcomes.  The best possible outcome is defecting while one’s partner cooperates . . . .  The 
next best outcome is mutual cooperation . . . followed by mutual defection . . ., with the 
worst outcome being the case in which one cooperates while one’s partner defects . . . .”). 
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each of them.  The key variable in that case is trust.  If there is no 
possibility of communication, trust does not make any sense rationally.199 
In addition to its instrumental value in overcoming problems of collective 
irrationality, trust is also an attitude toward life.  The standard law and 
economics perspective leaves out the nonconsequential motivations that 
individuals may have for their behavior.200  Although “[m]uch of economic 
behavior is purely consequentialist,”201 investing a substantial proportion of 
one’s time and wealth in a close corporation may be about means as well as 
ends.202  If close corporation shareholders intend to make money but also 
wish to participate with friends and family in a meaningful business 
venture, a rational choice account of the investment decision will be 
incomplete and misleading.203 
To summarize, even if law and economics scholars were right to assume 
that investors approximate the rational choice model when selecting the 
corporate form and in negotiating their rights before investing, there would 
still be a substantial role for judicial monitoring.  Shareholder oppression 
doctrine reduces the need for expensive ex ante bargaining, allowing the 
participants to proceed with an incomplete agreement.  Finally, by reducing 
the need for hardnosed bargaining, laws that protect shareholders from 
opportunism facilitate an atmosphere of trust. 
IV.  WHY CONTRACT THEORY JUSTIFIES SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 
This part contends that contract theory, properly understood, offers the 
best rationale for minority shareholder protection in close corporations.  
Importantly, the “you made your bed” version of contract invoked by law 
and economics does not actually exist—and for good reason.204  Since at 
 
 199. Crozier, supra note 194, at 307.  Of course, close corporations lack the formal 
structure of the prisoners’ dilemma because coordination is possible—indeed, the 
contractarian objection emphasizes that shareholders ought to negotiate before investing.  
The point is simply that, to the extent that a corporation can operate more efficiently if the 
parties have a high degree of trust in one another, individually rational self-protection at each 
stage of a corporation’s operation could lead to the collectively undesirable result of a 
hobbled corporate enterprise. 
 200. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 81 (stating that “motivations may be consequentialist or 
nonconsequentialist, that is, oriented either toward the outcome of action or toward the 
action itself”). 
 201. Id. (“When people put aside money for their old age or stockbrokers buy and sell 
shares, they attach no intrinsic value—positive or negative—to these actions themselves; 
they care only about the outcomes.”). 
 202. By contrast, standard economic analysis assumes in every situation that “[r]ational 
individuals invest their . . . capital with a view to maximizing the value of such resources.” 
O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 220. 
 203. Arguably, the shareholders’ goals can be described in consequential terms, even if 
they are non-monetary, but this still understates the extent to which social norms motivate 
behavior. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 83 (describing social norms as “a further special 
case of nonconsequentialist behavior”). 
 204. Some law and economics scholars argue that contract law should shed its equitable 
trappings, but that is a much broader discussion.  It will suffice to observe here that the 
contractarian critique of shareholder oppression doctrine is inconsistent with modern 
contract law.  For general criticism of the proposed revival of formalism in contract analysis, 
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least the nineteenth century merger of law and equity, courts have placed 
equitable limits on the substance of contract205 and have taken a substantial 
ex post role in interpreting contract terms:  “judicial determination of the 
contractual obligation serves as a fallback mechanism for vindicating the 
parties’ intent whenever a court determines that the formal contract terms 
fall seriously short of achieving the parties’ purposes.”206 
Part V.A contends that the close corporation bargain creates a long-term 
relationship that may be broader and more nuanced than the terms that have 
been reduced to writing.207  Part V.B argues that contract law’s implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing explains shareholder oppression 
doctrine more convincingly than the fiduciary approach courts often claim 
to follow.  Part V.C shows that recent innovations in LLC law do not 
reduce the need for equitable oversight of investor bargains, either in the 
close corporation or the LLC context. 
A.  The Close Corporation as Relational Contract 
In a “relational contract,” the parties intend to formalize a relationship 
rather than commit to a discrete transaction.208  Thus, “[a] contract is 
 
see Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern 
Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 943 (2009). 
 205. For instance, courts refuse to enforce liquidated damages provisions that provide for 
recovery exceeding actual damages. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and 
the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1043–44 (2009) (describing 
“the penalty doctrine” and other equitable limitations to common law contract doctrine, 
including “equitable exceptions to the parol evidence rule” and a “part-performance 
exception to the Statute of Frauds”). 
 206. Id. at 1025.  Professors Kraus and Scott dislike this “judicial insurance policy against 
formal contract terms” because they contend that sophisticated parties may prefer to limit the 
scope of judicial interpretation, and enforcing the parties’ “ends” can interfere with the 
enforcement of their selected “means.” Id. at 1025–27 (“Sometimes the only way to maintain 
fidelity to the parties’ contractual intent is to enforce the formal contract terms to which they 
agreed, even when doing so defeats their contractual ends.”).  Assuming that some parties 
make a rational tradeoff between litigation costs and opportunism, however, it blinkers 
reality to assume that all “firms organized in corporate form with five or more employees” 
count as “‘sophisticated economic actors.’” Id. at 1026 n.6 (citing Alan Schwartz & Robert 
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003)).  
Also, because controlling shareholders can usually protect themselves without the assistance 
of a court, the risk of opportunism falls disproportionately on the minority shareholders.  
Before we assume that close corporation shareholders may have intended their “means” to 
trump their “ends,” we should recall that they are situated differently:  controlling 
shareholders would receive most of the benefits of the tradeoff and minority shareholders 
would bear most of the costs. 
 207. See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (observing that in 
close corporations “[t]he parties’ full understanding may not even be in writing but may have 
to be construed from their actions”). 
 208. For foundational work in relational contract theory, see Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:  
Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and 
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); see also Eisenberg, supra note 55, 
at 816 (defining the relational contract concept:  “What is especially striking about the 
numerous efforts to define relational contracts . . . is that a straightforward definition . . . is 
readily at hand.  The obvious definition of a relational contract is a contract that involves not 
merely an exchange, but also a relationship, between the contracting parties.”).  Professor 
Eisenberg contends that what is needed, however, is not a special doctrine of relational 
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relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important 
terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations.”209  Indeed, even 
though the parties to a relational contract may anticipate certain issues, they 
will often be unable to resolve those issues in advance.210  Typically, 
relational contracts involve long-term arrangements, “but temporal 
extension per se is not the defining characteristic.”211 
Close corporations are quintessential relational contracts.212  The 
founding shareholders negotiate a long-term, open-ended relationship with 
each other for the general purpose of operating a profitable business.  
Moreover, shareholder relations are often bolstered by preexisting business 
or family connections.213  No matter how cogent their business plan, the 
parties will need to remain involved and flexible, because the needs of the 
business will evolve over time.214  Some potential problems cannot be 
solved in advance without creating new ones.  For instance, even if the 
parties anticipate the possibility of shareholder dissension, specific contract 
provisions cannot supplant the role of good faith; the minority might 
opportunistically exploit strong exit rights or veto powers.  Yet without 
those rights, the majority can use its control to disadvantage the minority.215 
Although few law and economics scholars would deny that close 
corporation governance is “relational,” the law and economics model leaves 
no room for an evolving, flexible bargain governed more by good faith than 
by specific contract terms.216  Rather, law and economics theory builds 
upon a vision of contract “as ‘nothing more than a sale with a time 
lag . . . distributing risk.’”217  In a discrete exchange, the parties owe no 
 
contract but a greater appreciation of relational aspects that impact the interpretation of any 
contract. See id. at 817. 
 209. Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1091. 
 210. See id. (“[D]efinitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify 
uncertain future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations 
adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance.”).  Thus, 
relational contract theory “borders closely on the field of transaction-cost economics.” 
Coffee, supra note 7, at 1619 n.5. 
 211. Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1091. 
 212. Moll, supra note 32, at 756 (“[T]he investment bargains entered into by close 
corporation shareholders reflect the characteristics of relational contracts.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 
751 (1974) (observing that “the creation of a new joint enterprise, such as a business 
partnership or close corporation, is normally preceded by other business relations giving rise 
to a willingness to go into a deeper relation”). 
 214. Moll, note 32, at 756 (“[T]he very nature of employment and management bargains 
requires the ongoing personal involvement of the parties.”). 
 215. As I have previously argued, the possibility of shareholder oppression is a seemingly 
unavoidable consequence of the informal, efficient operation of a close corporation. See 
Means, supra note 59, at 1209.  Courts have sought to provide ex post relief to minority 
shareholders where appropriate without undermining the ex ante flexibility that makes the 
close corporation form attractive. See id. 
 216. As discussed supra Part IV, standard law and economics assumes that rational 
investors will address contractual incompleteness through the choice of business form and 
selective tailoring of default rules. 
 217. Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations:  Its Shortfalls and the 
Need for a “Rich Classificatory Apparatus”, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1020 (1981) (citation 
omitted); Joo, supra note 41, at 805 (“In corporations theory, though not in contract theory, 
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duties prior to contract, and all duties are specified in the contract.218  By 
presupposing an arm’s-length bargain, standard law and economics misses 
much of what matters in corporate governance arrangements.219  
Consequently, viewing corporate governance through the lens of standard 
law and economics contract theory produces a distorted and incomplete 
picture.  Because a corporate venture is a relationship more than it is a 
discrete bargain, courts properly turn to equitable principles when necessary 
to honor the parties’ intent and to prevent opportunistic abuse of the 
contractual relationship.220 
To be clear, the argument advanced here is not that relational contract 
constitutes a distinct legal category or that special rules of contract 
interpretation should apply.  Rather, relational contract theory suggests an 
approach to the interpretation of all contracts, focusing on matters that 
receive little or no attention under standard economic analysis.221  In 
particular, as discussed in the next two sections, a relational contract 
approach helps us to see why agreements governing shareholder 
relationships are highly vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation and to 
identify equitable aspects of contract theory that explain and justify the 
judicial protection of the parties’ reasonable expectations. 
1.  Shareholder Oppression as Opportunism 
A literal bargain of any complexity can be exploited opportunistically—
think of all the tales involving genies, lamps, and wishes gone awry—and 
equitable considerations inform every contractual relationship.222  Indeed, 
the careful judicial response to the problem of minority shareholder 
oppression in close corporations can be understood as an application of 
equitable contracting principles.223  The implied covenant of good faith and 
 
the battle over the terrain of ‘contract’ is essentially over.  The free-market . . . connotations 
of CONTRACT . . . have taken firm root . . . .”). 
 218. Macneil, supra note 217, at 1019. 
 219. For instance, in a close corporation, shareholders are unlikely to draft a new contract 
to reflect every alteration of the business relationship. See Moll, supra note 32, at 760 
(“Under the relational theory, the parties expect that the terms of their relationship will 
evolve.  There is no need for formalities to validate new practices in order to make those 
practices part of the contract.”) (citation omitted). 
 220. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3.13, at 
155–56 (4th ed. 1998). 
 221. To the extent all contracts are more relational than they are discrete, the norms of 
relational contracting may entirely occupy the field. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 817 
(arguing that no legally significant distinction between relational and discrete contracts is 
possible, and that separate legal rules are unnecessary because “relational contracts and 
contracts are virtually one and the same”).  If this is a slippery slope, the end result seems 
desirable. 
 222. See, e.g., Kraus & Scott, supra note 205, at 1025 (“Honoring the contractual intent 
of the parties is the central objective of contract law.”). 
 223. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 809–10 (“Because the objective of contract law 
should be to further the interests of the contracting parties, the rules of contract law must 
often be formulated so that their application will turn on the particular circumstances of the 
parties’ transactions and, in certain cases, on the parties’ subjective intentions.”). 
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fair dealing fills in gaps in the parties’ agreement and limits their ability to 
exploit control provisions in unforeseen circumstances.224 
The covenant can be stated plainly:  if the literal terms of a contract allow 
one party to do something that the other party clearly would not have 
countenanced if consulted in advance, then the conduct at issue is bad-faith 
opportunism.225  For instance, a majority’s argument that the default rules 
of corporate law give it the power to decide all questions concerning 
dividends and employment should not, without more, dispose of a specific 
shareholder oppression claim brought by a minority shareholder who has 
been denied any financial return on her investment.  Minority shareholder 
oppression, therefore, can be understood as nothing more than a special 
case of the opportunistic conduct courts police in all contracts.226 
Even staunch defenders of the bargain-for-it-if-you-want-it approach to 
shareholder rights in close corporations acknowledge that “[t]he problem of 
distinguishing legitimate exercise of contract rights from opportunistic 
behavior is pervasive in the law of contracts.”227  This admission matters 
because it shows that contract analysis requires more than a parsing of 
written terms.  Courts can view shareholder disputes in contractual terms 
without any overlay of fiduciary duty and still protect minority shareholders 
from abusive overreaching by the majority. 
 
 224. For an argument emphasizing a need for constraints on contracting, see Thompson, 
supra note 2, at 394 (“A close corporation is like a long-term relational contract in which 
benefits for all parties necessarily depend on unstated assumptions.  A fully contingent 
contract cannot be drafted, so some ex post settling up by courts is used to support these 
assumptions.”).  Professor Thompson contends that mandatory rules are necessary “[t]o the 
extent that corporate law is the intersection of a variety of relational contracts which reflect 
expectations that cannot be specified in distinct transactions.” Id. at 387.  Thus, he concludes 
that “[t]here are times when law does not and should not yield to private ordering, either 
because of third party effects or because of distrust of the bargain between the parties.” Id. at 
379. 
 225. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986).  Professor 
Ribstein adds that opportunistic conduct takes “selfish advantage” of “the literal terms of the 
contract” and “gaps or costs of the legal system.” RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 17.  For further 
definitions of “opportunism,” see supra note 12. 
 226. See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 149, § 7.01[E], at 7-131 (stating that the “tension 
between (1) enforcing a contract as written, and (2) construing a contract to prohibit 
opportunistic conduct, is present in a number of oppression disputes.”).  To the extent some 
law and economics scholars have acknowledged the complexity of shareholder bargains and 
intermittent need for judicial monitoring, the relational-contract theory provides a context for 
those concessions. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 108, at 192 (contending that even in the 
canonical work of the contractarian movement, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel 
“avoid modeling internal relationships in the discrete transactional terms that prevail in 
neoclassical microeconomic analyses of corporate arrangements” and instead implicitly 
adopt “the relational contract paradigm”). 
 227. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 248 n.29.  Under an earlier, more 
formalistic model of contract, objective intent ruled and considerations of good faith would 
have been irrelevant. See Smith & King, supra note 80, at 5–7 (contrasting classical and 
neoclassical contract theory).  Both versions of contract law “rely heavily on a stylized 
image of exchange involving two roughly equal parties.” Id. at 7. 
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Judicial gap filling has its limits, of course, because litigation costs 
money and time, and courts cannot always ascertain the parties’ intent.228  
Whether a party is enjoying the benefit of its bargain or behaving 
opportunistically may not always be clear.  Consequently, there may be 
many cases where minority shareholders decide that litigation is not 
feasible or where no recourse will be available.  Nevertheless, an imperfect 
remedy for minority shareholders is better than none at all.229 
2.  Reasonable Expectations in a Relational Contract 
As a descriptive account, the relational contract perspective, unlike the 
standard law and economics alternative, offers a coherent explanation of 
shareholder oppression doctrine.230  In a growing number of jurisdictions, 
courts evaluate claims of oppression by asking whether the majority has 
deprived the minority of the objectively reasonable expectations that 
motivated its investment.231  In other words, has the majority abused its 
control so as to deprive the minority of the benefit of its bargain? 
Conduct that is contrary to the reasonable expectations of the parties will 
also run afoul of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied 
in every contract.  This has an important practical consequence:  rather than 
 
 228. For instance, courts must decide whether silence on a point reflects an intention to 
exclude or simply a lack of attention:  “A missing term likely means that the parties did not 
want it, but it could mean that they were ignorant . . . .” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra 
note 1, at 238.  It may also be difficult to see how the parties intended their negotiated 
provisions to interact with background rules of law. See Larry Ribstein, Contracting for 
Termination of an LLC, IDEOBLOG (Dec. 22, 2009, 5:29 AM), 
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/12/contracting-for-termination-of-an-llc.html.  
The problem with the [oppression] remedy is that it may be hard to square with the 
contract.  After all, the whole reason for the remedy is that the contract does not 
provide for exit, yet the court is providing one.  One might say that the parties in 
effect adopted the statutory default rules, including the oppression remedy.  But it 
still may not be clear how the parties wanted those defaults to fit with their 
agreement. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 229. If law and economics scholars could show that the overall cost of judicial 
involvement in close corporation business disputes outweighs its benefits, then perhaps 
“penalty default” rules that force minority shareholders to bargain at their peril would be 
appropriate. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 101, at 93 (“If it is costly for the courts to 
determine what the parties would have wanted, it may be efficient to choose a default rule 
that induces the parties to contract explicitly.”).  As discussed supra Part II, however, close 
corporation shareholders systematically fail to bargain in advance to protect their interests.  
A penalty default approach would have harsh consequences for existing shareholders and 
only a hazy, speculative impact on future parties. 
 230. Cf. Posner, supra note 20, at 863 (stating that, given the inability of economic 
models to predict behavior, “we are left with a sterile normative defense of freedom of 
contract”).  In particular, “the premise of full rationality does not seem right, for it predicts 
contractual structures that bear little resemblance to the contracts designed by real parties.” 
Id.  Thus contracts may be incomplete both because of “the cost of negotiating and writing” 
the agreement and because of “cognitive limits of the parties, which include the inability to 
foresee future events and maybe something more.” Id. at 866. 
 231. See Matheson & Maler, supra note 4, at 679.  Admittedly, we may have difficulty 
determining what is objectively reasonable when some but not all aspects of the agreement 
have been reduced to writing. 
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arguing across a seemingly unbridgeable chasm between those who would 
offer special protections for minority shareholders and those who would 
not, we can focus instead on the meaning of “good faith” and other well-
accepted equitable contract principles.232  However we may choose to 
define good faith, the use of contract interpretation principles to inform 
reasonable expectations analysis rebuts the contractarian objection that 
those who would protect minority shareholders are simply making it up as 
they go along.233 
Thus, the equation of oppression doctrine and equitable contract analysis 
clarifies that while the reasonable expectations standard requires courts to 
exercise judgment—based on careful analysis of the parties’ overall 
relationship—it does not invite courts to create a different set of rights and 
obligations for the parties than those they intended to assume.  A minority 
shareholder’s expectations reflect the parties’ objective intentions both at 
the time of investment and as the relationship has evolved over time.234  
Equitable contract analysis permits courts to recognize and enforce the 
parties’ “true” bargain, even if it lacks the definiteness that contract law 
doctrine might require in the context of a discrete exchange.235  Some 
flexibility is critical if courts are to identify and redress oppression; at the 
same time, it is fundamental to contract law that a court “may not substitute 
its own notions of fairness for the terms of the agreement reached by the 
parties.”236 
Another advantage of equitable contract theory is that it helps explain 
why minority investors should not be permitted to insist upon their 
“expectations” without also holding up their end of the bargain.  As some 
commentators have observed, reasonable expectations analysis can mislead 
courts into believing that only minority expectations count.237  For example, 
 
 232. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1654–55 (discussing various definitions and concluding 
that “it may be easier to define ‘bad faith’ than ‘good faith’”). 
 233. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 1, at 955 (describing shareholder oppression remedies 
as a “‘wild card’ that creates costly uncertainty for parties to closely held firms”).  In 
previous work, I have expressed concern that “reasonable expectations” analysis, without 
some guiding principle, may be circular. See Means, supra note 59, at 1227.  However, the 
problem of circularity can be alleviated by offering “a deeper theory of shareholder rights 
and obligations.” Id.  Contract theory is useful in this respect. 
 234. To the extent some jurisdictions may exclude post-investment expectations, they 
should reconsider that stance. See Moll, supra note 32, at 720 (“A strict time of investment 
standard . . . seems to ignore the possibility that post-investment expectations may arise.”). 
 235. Professor Douglas Moll is right to observe that “[a]lthough both oppression 
precedents and contract precedents base their decisions on breached ‘agreements’ and 
‘understandings’ between the parties, it is clear that different meanings are ascribed to these 
terms.” Moll, supra note 4, at 1066.  Professor Moll concludes, however, that “it is fair to 
assert that oppression law is doing what contract law should be doing if contract law took a 
broader perspective when identifying and enforcing bargains.” Id. at 1073.  As described in 
this Article, a relational theory of contract takes that “broader perspective.” 
 236. See Lola Cars Int’l Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, Nos. 4479, 4886, 2009 WL 4052681, 
at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2009). 
 237. See Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations:  
Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371, 398 (2003) 
(contending that “the focus on the minority’s expectations rather than on the majority’s 
duties tends to subvert the principle of majority rule in corporate governance and to penalize 
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in a case where a minority shareholder (who was also an employee) had 
assaulted another employee and damaged a customer’s personal property, a 
court found that terminating the shareholder’s employment somehow 
violated his reasonable expectations.238  In another case, a court found in 
favor of the minority shareholder and stated baldly that “[w]hether the 
controlling shareholders discharged petitioner for cause or in their good 
business judgment is irrelevant.”239  If courts used equitable contract 
principles to define “reasonable expectations,” the difference between a 
shareholder’s conditional expectation of employment and rights owed by 
virtue of shareholder status would be clear.240  Under contract analysis, 
employment is not an absolute right; unclean hands should bar equitable 
relief.241  Put differently, it is not reasonable to expect continued 
employment when egregious cause exists for termination. 
Some might object that contract theory cannot explain shareholder 
oppression doctrine because of the time inconsistency of shareholder 
investment.  Indeed, the corporation may include “shareholders who have 
made no investment” and “who receive their shares as gifts or 
inheritances.”242  For those shareholders, there is no bargained-for 
investment decision.  Moreover, even if some change to the previous 
shareholder relationship were contemplated, “a modification under contract 
law requires additional consideration to be enforceable.”243  If equitable 
contract analysis covered only first generation investors and offered no 
insight into reasonable expectations among close corporation shareholders 
who invested or inherited shares anytime after formation, contract theory 
would fail to account for the judicial protection of minority shareholders. 
However, the rights of post-founding investors and even those who take 
their shares as a gift or an inheritance can be clarified by analysis of the 
parties’ understood bargain.  First, it is worth underscoring that reasonable 
 
conduct of the majority even when justified”); Moll, supra note 92, at 806–07 (identifying a 
“pure minority perspective” that ignores evidence of “[a] minority shareholder’s misconduct 
or incompetence in his job” if the plaintiff can show that there was a “basic understanding of 
employment”). 
 238. See Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994); see also Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 
532605, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002) (finding that plaintiff “was hardly a model 
employee” but that his termination was not justified because, “as a founder and a nearly one-
third minority shareholder, he was entitled to the utmost good faith and fair dealing”).  The 
plaintiff’s termination followed an e-mail message interpreted by the defendants as a threat 
of violence. Id. at *4. 
 239. In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1980).  For further criticism of this 
decision, see Art, supra note 237, at 396–97; Moll, supra note 92, at 767–69. 
 240. Cf. Art, supra note 237, at 417–18 (assuming flaws in reasonable expectations 
approach and contending that courts should instead use fiduciary analysis to identify 
oppression). 
 241. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 3 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.4, at 164–65 (3d 
ed. 2004) (listing “equity’s colorful maxims” embodying the equitable restrictions, including 
“one who comes into equity must come with clean hands”). 
 242. Moll, supra note 32, at 720. 
 243. Id. at 751–52 (citing JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 5-14, at 262 (3d ed. 1987)). 
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expectations analysis does not give courts an open-ended license to meddle 
in a corporation’s internal affairs in order to produce a “fairer” result; non-
investing minority shareholders cannot claim an entitlement to valuable 
rights they never bargained for and that are not conveyed by shareholder 
status alone.  For instance, the fact that an original shareholder worked for 
the business does not guarantee employment for his heirs, who may be 
incompetent, disinterested, or both.  Thus, the lack of remedy available for 
some types of claims may be a virtue of the contractual approach.244 
Second, because contributions to small corporate enterprises are often 
“team specific,” meaning that resources committed to the business cannot 
be moved elsewhere without substantial loss of value,245 it would seem 
plausible to treat those contributions over time as the equivalent of other 
forms of bargained-for consideration.  For instance, if a second generation 
shareholder spent her entire adult life working for the corporation, and 
profits were distributed substantially through salary, the fact that she did not 
pay for her shares initially should not preclude an argument that she had a 
reasonable expectation of continued employment based on an understood 
bargain among the shareholders without which she would not have 
contributed her labor.  The issue should be whether the evidence supports 
her claim despite the lack of an explicit employment agreement, not 
whether contract law permits her to make the argument.246 
Finally, although contract theory illuminates shareholder oppression law, 
corporations are only metaphorically contractual.247  If specific contract law 
doctrines make no sense in the context of close corporations, they should be 
jettisoned.  Moreover, the centrality of contract values to shareholder 
oppression analysis does not negate the existence of other important 
values.248  For instance, there may be circumstances in which legitimate 
and important business purposes should take priority over the minority’s 
otherwise reasonable expectations.  Likewise, there may be cases where the 
majority has abused its control as part of a scheme to freeze out the 
minority, even though the minority had no enforceable expectation 
concerning the particular matter at issue.  On the whole, though, equitable 
 
 244. See, e.g., Whitehorn v. Whitehorn Farms, Inc., 195 P.3d 836, 842 (Mont. 2008) 
(holding that plaintiff shareholder had no reasonable expectation of dividends because he 
received his shares as a gift, and the corporation had no history of paying dividends). 
 245. See Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1755 (noting that “contracting difficulties can 
discourage investment in team production, especially when invested resources become ‘team 
specific,’ so that team members cannot walk away from the project without losing some of 
the value of their investment”). 
 246. Professor Moll discusses an analogous case where a shareholder investor does not 
expect employment at the time capital is contributed—unlike his fellow investors—but that 
expectation alters in the first months of the venture.  As Professor Moll points out, it would 
seem anomalous to allow the other shareholders to terminate his employment years later, 
despite the “near-equivalence of the minority shareholders’ situations.” Moll, supra note 32, 
at 719. 
 247. See Joo, supra note 41, at 805. 
 248. For further discussion of value pluralism and shareholder oppression law, see 
Benjamin Means, The Vacuity of Wilkes, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (draft 
on file with author). 
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contract theory sets forth appropriate contours for shareholder oppression 
law. 
B.  A Modest Role for Fiduciary Duties 
Some commentators contend not just that contract analysis has limits but 
also that it is an unhelpful way of framing the corporate relationship.  These 
commentators assert that strong fiduciary duties, akin to those owed by 
partners—which go further than the basic loyalty and care provisions 
applicable to corporate managers—are needed in order to protect minority 
shareholders from oppression at the hands of controlling shareholders.249  
On this view, no plausible interpretation of the parties’ actual bargain can 
substitute for mandatory duties that enforce an appropriate code of 
conduct.250 
Yet, the objection to contractual analysis assumes a narrow version of 
contract based on a classical model of discrete exchange.251  If contract 
analysis had no ability to respond to the problems posed by relational 
contract and required us to reject all judicial monitoring of the parties’ 
relationship as “neo-Marxist” meddling,252 then we would have a clear 
choice to make between contract and fiduciary duty analysis.253  However, 
if contract law is understood to include a strong obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing, and if courts can use that obligation to fill gaps in the parties’ 
 
 249. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”:  From Tax 
Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 445, 470 (2009) (“In short, to rely on the contractual duty of good faith as a substitute for 
fiduciary duty is akin to replacing heavy cream with skim milk.”); Sandra K. Miller, The 
Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory 
Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 
(2004) (contending that fiduciary obligations are the key to preventing freeze outs in LLCs 
and that contractual duty of good faith is not an adequate substitute). 
 250. See Kleinberger, supra note 249, at 469 (“History suggests that contractual good 
faith and fiduciary duty are not functional equivalents; they developed independently to 
serve different values.”).  Professor Kleinberger contends that “[p]roperly understood, the 
contractual duty is ancillary and subservient to the contractual arrangements.” Id.  Thus, 
good faith’s “function is to allow the contract to mean what it says; it is therefore of no use 
to police misconduct that is outside the contract.” Id. at 469–70.  However, what is within 
the scope of the parties’ agreement is itself subject to interpretation, so the distinction 
between contractual and extra-contractual duties may be less crisp than Professor 
Kleinberger’s argument seems to assume. 
 251. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty Into Contract, 41 
TULSA L. REV. 451, 452 (2006) (arguing in context of unincorporated business associations 
against “trying to replace an established duty of loyalty with weak and nebulous notions of 
good faith”).  Professor Dibadj contends that good faith analysis “deploys outworn economic 
concepts reminiscent of the neoclassical Chicago School . . . based on facile assumptions 
applied in a static manner.” Id.  Professor Dibadj rejects the possibility of a more 
“sophisticated contract theory” and does not consider the relational-contract approach 
recommended here. Id. at 463–64. 
 252. See Dalley, supra note 1, at 222. 
 253. This assumes, of course, that we could agree on the meaning of fiduciary duty. See, 
e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:  An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (“Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-
American law.”); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2002) (“Fiduciary law is messy.”). 
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contract consistent with the parties’ reasonable expectations, then fiduciary 
duties can be confined for the most part to the traditional duty of loyalty 
owed by directors and controlling shareholders in all corporations.254 
Once we recognize that contract analysis has an equitable component, 
“[f]iduciary and good faith duties may be difficult to distinguish in 
practice.”255  This is especially true for a contract governing a long-term 
relationship, because so much depends on good faith performance by the 
parties in situations that cannot be fully anticipated in advance.  Taken 
seriously, the duty of good faith gives courts ample ability to regulate 
shareholder relationships.  One court explained, in the context of a limited 
partnership: 
If in each contract the parties had to expressly describe and prohibit every 
artifice by which the parties could potentially deprive each other of the 
fruits of their agreement, then contracts would soon become as long as the 
tax code, as difficult to interpret, and (like the tax code) still contain 
innumerable loopholes available to a party that wished to avoid the spirit 
of its bargain.256 
The court concluded that it is preferable “to treat a contract for what it is—
an exchange of solemn promises—and enforce the objectively reasonable 
expectations of the parties.”257 
In fact, a relational contract model may sometimes afford minority 
shareholders greater protection than would a fiduciary alternative.  For 
instance, “[w]hen directors consider a dividend policy, they are not 
 
 254. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).  In exercising 
control, shareholder directors are subject to “usual fiduciary duties in acting on behalf of the 
corporation.” Dalley, supra note 1, at 212.  Some may object that a move away from a 
stronger conception of fiduciary duty represents “a significant dilution of fiduciary duty as 
an aspirational precept to guide the conduct of corporate power holders in favor of rules 
protecting Holmes’s ‘bad man’ from unintentionally incurring liability.” Lawrence E. 
Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 
1681–82 (1990) (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. 
L. REV. 457, 461 (1897)).  However, this gives too little attention to the duty of good faith.  
Whether or not good faith is an “aspirational” concept, it precludes parties from acting 
opportunistically while also recognizing the fact that parties need to know what the law 
requires in order to comply with it. 
 255. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES 
219 (4th ed. 2009). 
 256. Or. RSA No. 6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Or. Ltd. P’ship, 840 F. Supp. 770, 
776 (D. Or. 1993), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 76 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 
Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1465 (“Because of the difficulty of predicting and planning for 
future events and their impact on a business enterprise, an opportunistic shareholder who 
controls one or more aspects of a closely held corporation will often find ways to exploit 
bargained-out structural and distributional rules that seemed both fair and complete at the 
time of the bargain.”). 
 257. Castle Rock Cellular, 840 F. Supp. at 776.  As the Chief Justice of the Delaware 
Supreme Court recently argued in the context of LLC law, courts are perfectly capable of 
enforcing the parties’ true bargain and curbing opportunism through a contractual analysis. 
See Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware 
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 232 (2009) 
(“[A]ny ‘bad acting’ will be ferreted out by the parties’ bargain and the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.”). 
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‘interested’ because their interest is no different from that of the other 
stockholders, even if some or all of the directors have personal situations 
that lead them to prefer one policy over another.”258  Because the minority 
shareholders cannot allege a violation of the duty of loyalty, the managers’ 
decision will be protected by the business judgment rule, and there will be 
no recourse for the minority.  To the extent that the parties’ investment 
bargain included a particular policy with respect to dividends, however, a 
shareholder could conceivably establish a contract-based claim.259  
Moreover, there is no question that relational contract duties are owed to the 
contracting parties.  With respect to fiduciary duty, “it is not clear whether 
the duty is owed to the other stockholders directly or whether it is owed to 
the corporation and only derivatively benefits the minority stockholder.”260 
In a recent decision involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in a 
close corporation, Delaware Chancellor William Chandler remarked upon 
the absence of any claims for breach of contract.261  The minority 
shareholder, eBay, had bargained for certain protections (including 
cumulative voting, which guaranteed it the ability to elect one member of 
the three-person board of directors) in connection with its investment in 
craigslist.262  When it became clear that the parties’ longer-term goals were 
not aligned, eBay exercised its contractual rights to launch a competing 
venture.263  Craigslist’s controlling shareholder responded by taking steps 
to ensure, among other things, that eBay would no longer be able to elect a 
representative to craigslist’s board of directors.264  eBay argued that the 
controlling shareholders had breached their fiduciary duty, and Chancellor 
Chandler observed that 
[t]hroughout this dispute, I have repeatedly read and listened to what look 
and sound like breach of contract arguments, which eBay uses not to 
prove [that the controlling shareholders] breached a contract, but rather to 
prove [that they] breached their fiduciary duties.  This has been an odd 
 
 258. Dalley, supra note 1, at 217; see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 
720–21 (Del. 1971) (distinguishing dividend policy established by controlling shareholder 
that included minority shareholders and was therefore protected by the business judgment 
rule and dealings with subsidiary that allegedly transferred assets to another subsidiary 
wholly owned by the controlling shareholder, thus excluding the minority from a 
proportional share of the return). 
 259. This is not to say that the evidence would often support a claim, but only that the 
business judgment rule would not effectively bar it. 
 260. Dalley, supra note 1, at 179. 
 261. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, No. 3705, 2010 WL 3516473, at *18 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2010). 
 262. Id. at *5.  Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, craigslist enacted a “new charter [that] 
provides for a three-person board of directors to be elected under a cumulative voting 
regime.  The mechanics of cumulative voting ensured that eBay could use its 28.4% stake in 
craigslist to unilaterally elect one of the three members to the craigslist board.” Id. 
 263. Id. at *6 (“[T]he Shareholders’ Agreement does expressly and unequivocally permit 
eBay to compete but guarantees certain consequences should eBay do so.”).  Loss of 
cumulative voting rights is not one of the specified consequences, however. See id. 
 264. Id. at *12 (noting that the controlling shareholders sought to identify “capital 
structure or corporate governance changes that . . . would make it impossible for eBay to 
place a director on the board and would limit eBay’s ability to purchase additional craigslist 
shares”). 
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exercise, and I admit I am puzzled by eBay’s decision not to bring a 
breach of contract claim or, more promising perhaps, a claim for breach of 
the implied covenant, considering eBay expended significant effort 
arguing that the 2008 Board Actions violated both the technical provisions 
and the spirit of the [Stock Purchase Agreement] and the Shareholders’ 
Agreement.265 
Ultimately, craigslist’s controlling shareholders succeeded in blocking 
eBay’s ability to appoint a board member by amending craigslist’s charter 
to create a staggered board.  For eBay’s cumulative-voting right to matter, 
all three members of the board must stand for election at the same time.  By 
altering the voting rules such that only one director would be elected each 
year, the controlling shareholders ensured that eBay would never have the 
voting power to elect a director.  Arguably, this maneuver was not in good 
faith, given the parties’ explicit contractual bargain.  But eBay did not 
allege any contractual violation, and so the court did not formally resolve 
the issue.266 
Admittedly, fiduciary duties borrowed from partnership law could be 
applied expansively to require the operating majority to exercise control in 
the interest of the minority.267  This would address the problem of minority 
shareholder oppression quite effectively but would also defeat the purpose 
of acquiring control and contradict the basic majoritarian premise of 
corporate law.268  As the Chief Judge of the Delaware Supreme Court has 
observed, “The danger in applying default fiduciary duties is that, rather 
than determining the ex ante intent of the parties as contemplated by their 
agreement, a court might be wooed by plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claims and 
accept their proposal to apply an ex post fiduciary duty analysis.”269  If 
applied expansively, a fiduciary norm of selflessness would conflict with a 
shareholder’s basic right of “selfish ownership.”270 
 
 265. Id. at *18. 
 266. It should be noted, however, that the court expressed considerable skepticism about 
the merits of such an argument, since eBay’s right to compete caused its bargained-for 
protections to elapse, and one of these protections was “the contractual right . . . to consent 
to any charter amendment that would ‘adversely affect [] [eBay].’” Id. at *26.  The court 
opined that “the Staggered Board Amendments cannot be inequitable because they were 
exactly the sort of consequence eBay accepted would occur if eBay decided to compete with 
craigslist.” Id.. 
 267. See Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“[R]ecognizing the fiduciary nature of a relationship does not give it content in any given 
context.”).  If one wanted to apply a strong version of fiduciary duty, there is in traditional 
fiduciary law a normative requirement of “selflessness” that goes far beyond the 
requirements imposed upon parties to an ordinary contract. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1658 
(“The traditional fiduciary ethic insists that the fiduciary act selflessly.”).  Thus, “a 
contracting party may seek to advance his own interests in good faith while a fiduciary may 
not . . . .” Id. 
 268. Also, fiduciary duty analysis could inhibit the parties’ ability to create a bargain that 
suits their particular needs. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1625 (“The problem with traditional 
fiduciary theory is its hostility to all forms of contractual innovation.”).  Equitable contract 
analysis works with the parties’ bargain. 
 269. Steele, supra note 257, at 236. 
 270. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006) (noting tension and holding 
that courts should strike a “proper balance between the majority’s ‘concede[d] . . . rights to 
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In our efforts to remedy minority shareholder oppression, we should 
remember also that the default rules of partnership law create different but 
not necessarily lesser dangers of opportunism: 
 Partnership form . . . exposes majority partners to two risks:  the risk 
that a minority partner will extort unfair changes in team rules by 
opportunistically threatening to dissolve the partnership and the risk that a 
minority partner will shirk, content in the belief that the majority will be 
unwilling to expel her for fear that a court might label the resulting 
dissolution wrongful.271 
Strong fiduciary principles that impede majority control expose 
corporations to attempts by minority investors to rewrite the rules in their 
own favor.272  Also, fiduciary standards, if interpreted too broadly, may 
stand in the way of the parties’ actual bargain.273  Accordingly, the 
argument that close corporations should be treated as if they were 
partnerships is unpersuasive.274  General corporate fiduciary duties imposed 
on corporate managers and on controlling shareholders to prevent theft of 
corporate opportunities and other property of the business offer important 
protection to minority investors, but equitable contract theory provides 
surer footing for shareholder oppression law. 
C.  LLCs and the Choice-of-Form Objection 
The relatively recent LLC form of business organization offers 
substantial advantages for privately owned businesses.275  No longer must 
investors choose between the management and exit rights of partnership 
law on the one hand and the limited liability of the corporate form on the 
other; the LLC provides the attractive aspects of both on a default basis.276  
Also, for investors concerned about unclear fiduciary norms, the LLC’s 
more explicitly contract-oriented format may be preferable.277  
 
what has been termed ‘selfish ownership,’’ and the minority’s reasonable expectations of 
benefit from its shares.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 271. O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 238. 
 272. For an application of fiduciary duty to a minority shareholder who wielded veto 
power, see Smith v. Atlantic Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 1981). 
 273. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1127 (“Rather than deriving its justification 
from the terms of the contract itself, [the fiduciary obligation] is imposed as a condition of 
the relationship, irrespective of efforts by individual bargainers to negotiate an alternative 
standard.”). 
 274. It may be that the strong notion of selfless conduct lacks coherence, even in the 
partnership context, except perhaps as an articulation of norms of fair dealing. See RIBSTEIN, 
supra note 10, at 171 (arguing that appropriate results in partnership disputes can be 
achieved through “a marginal constraint on selfish conduct” without also imposing “a broad 
prohibition on self-gain”). 
 275. See Miller, supra note 249, at 1609–10 (noting that “entrepreneurs have an 
unparalleled range of choices for structuring LLC relationships, and LLC participants have 
access to the twin benefits of corporate limited liability and flow-through partnership tax 
status.”). 
 276. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 119. 
 277. See Miller, supra note 249, at 1610 (citing Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC 
Statutes:  Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small 
Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 881 (1995); Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions 
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Accordingly, one scholar contends that the close corporation form was “a 
misbegotten compromise”278 and has proved to be an “evolutionary dead 
end.”279 
It is not clear, however, that the LLC is a panacea for shareholder 
oppression.  First, if the relationships among investors cause minority 
shareholders to underestimate the possibility of future oppression, the same 
departure from rational behavior will be exhibited when investors choose 
the business form.  Moving the problem does not answer it.280  Also, 
although the LLC form offers significant flexibility, investors must bargain 
for governance terms, and their difficulty in creating an operating 
agreement that deals appropriately with all possibilities is substantially 
identical to the problem close corporation shareholders face in negotiating 
articles of incorporation, by-laws, and shareholder agreements.281  
Moreover, in response to estate and gift tax rules that provide a lower 
valuation for tax purposes only if the children’s shares are not liquid, most 
LLC statutes have been amended to eliminate default exit rights.282  Thus, 
minority investors who choose an LLC are locked in by the default rules 
and vulnerable to mistreatment by the majority, just as they would be in a 
close corporation.283 
As recent LLC caselaw illustrates, courts must either apply the equitable 
principles evolved over long centuries of experience in the English and 
United States courts or else accept serious injustice in individual cases 
when the terms of the literal agreement depart in obvious ways from the 
parties’ intent.  For instance, in VGS, Inc. v. Castiel,284 a founding member 
lost control of his LLC, despite having bargained for the right to appoint 
 
Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 427, 428 (1991)).  Although the 
LLC statutes contain default terms, and some, unlike Delaware, include mandatory fiduciary 
duties, “[t]he statutes typically assume that the individual owners will develop their own 
LLC operating agreements that define their respective rights, responsibilities, and remedies.” 
Id. at 1610–11. 
 278. RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 252. 
 279. Id. at 102. 
 280. See Miller, supra note 249, at 1612 (finding that “classic ‘squeeze-out techniques,’ 
which have a long history in the close corporation setting of the past fifty years, are now 
surfacing in the context of the LLC”). 
 281. For an argument that courts should apply a full panoply of contract principles, 
including unconscionability, when parties waive fiduciary obligations in an LLC agreement, 
see Larry A. DiMatteo, Policing Limited Liability Companies Under Contract Law, 46 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 279 (2009).  The approach Professor DiMatteo recommends contrasts with this 
Article’s approach because it seems designed to limit the parties’ ability to tailor their 
bargain. See id. at 287 (identifying ways courts could apply dissolution statutes to create exit 
rights where appropriate, “[e]ven where the operating agreement contains a ‘no-exit’ 
provision”).  Although courts might in rare cases refuse to enforce the parties’ intended 
bargain, my focus here is on the use of equitable contract provisions to fill gaps in the 
parties’ agreement, furthering their actual intent. 
 282. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 179–80. 
 283. Id. at 180 (“Removal of buyout rights from LLCs has the perverse secondary effect 
of forcing lawmakers to provide a backup exit right.  Therefore, judicial dissolution, which 
had brought so much unpredictability to close corporations, now haunts the LLCs that 
replaced them.”). 
 284. No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000). 
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two of the three members of the Board of Managers.285  The independent 
member of the Board, who held a minority interest in the LLC, convinced 
the appointed member to defect and to effectuate a merger of the LLC into a 
corporation, relegating the original member to a minority position.286 
The founding member’s ouster violated none of the literal terms of the 
parties’ bargain.  The Delaware Court of Chancery observed that while the 
founding member would certainly have removed the faithless member of 
the Board, if given notice of the proposed merger, “the LLC Act, read 
literally, does not require notice . . . .”287  Yet the court further reasoned that 
the purpose of the statute was to enable “LLC managers to take quick, 
efficient action in situations where a minority of managers could not block 
or adversely affect the course set by the majority even if they were 
notified . . . .”288  That purpose was not advanced because the founding 
member “had the power to prevent any Board decision with which he 
disagreed.”289  The court rescinded the merger, relying on “a classic maxim 
of equity—‘equity looks to the intent rather than to the form.’”290  Thus, 
while there are substantial differences between LLCs and close 
corporations, the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing establishes 
common ground.291 
Finally, whether or not oppression analysis applies in the LLC context, 
the new choice of business form should not undermine existing protection 
of shareholders in close corporations.  To the extent the LLC form gives 
greater weight to the explicit terms of the parties’ bargain, as embodied in 
the operating agreement,292 the distinct treatment only means that investors 
who choose the corporate form (and who could have chosen LLC form) 
 
 285. Ironically, this bargained-for protection left him more exposed than he would have 
been had he relied on “the statutorily sanctioned mechanism of approval by members 
owning a majority of the LLC’s equity interests.” Id. at *4.  If the court chose to apply a 
formalistic contract interpretation, the express decision to reject the default protection would 
be presumed deliberate and informed, and the court would have no reason to consider 
evidence of overall intent. 
 286. See id. at *2.  The founding member of the LLC was also excluded from the board of 
directors of the newly-formed corporation. See id. 
 287. Id. at *4. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at *1. 
 290. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).  The court’s interpretation of the LLC Act (which 
formed the basis of the parties’ bargain) gave priority to considerations of equity.  Thus, the 
analysis was contractual in the modern rather than formal economic sense.  The court also 
described its holding in terms of the “duty of loyalty” members owe to the LLC and one 
another and to a general obligation of “good faith.” Id.  The connection the court intends to 
draw between these fiduciary obligations and the equitable interpretation of contract is not 
entirely clear.  For further discussion, see Mark J. Loewenstein, The Diverging Meaning of 
Good Faith, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 433, 450 (2009) (arguing that Castiel is best understood as 
an example of contractual good faith analysis). 
 291. See, e.g., Adlerstein v. Wertheimer, No. Civ.A. 19101, 2002 WL 205684, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 25, 2002) (evaluating adequacy of notice to close corporation shareholder and 
observing that plaintiff’s “more persuasive . . . arguments are predicated largely on . . . VGS, 
Inc. v. Castiel”). 
 292. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
23, 2009) (distinguishing freedom of contract in LLC from more limited freedom in 
corporate context). 
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may be presumed to have chosen the existing protections available in most 
jurisdictions for minority shareholders.293 
In sum, because the duty of good faith and fair dealing is an implied term 
in all contracts and opportunistic conduct is likely to be similar in LLCs and 
close corporations, courts should apply substantially the same oppression 
analysis in either context.  However, if courts take a narrow and literalistic 
approach to the interpretation of LLC agreements, that novel approach 
stands in sharp contrast both with courts’ longstanding willingness to 
protect minority shareholders from oppression and the equitable principles 
built into modern contract law more generally. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of methodology, contrasting views of contract theory 
contribute to the corporate governance debate by treating the framework for 
analysis as part of the discussion rather than a condition for it.294  
Commentators will continue to disagree about the appropriate scope of 
minority shareholder protection, but it would be a marked improvement if 
they seemed to be partaking in the same discussion.295  In broader context, 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge has gone so far as to conclude that “[a]s a 
matter of intellectual interest, the debate over the contractual nature of the 
firm is over” and “[c]ontractarians and noncontractarians no longer have 
much of interest to say to one another; indeed, they barely speak the same 
language.”296  As this Article has shown, though, we need not simply agree 
to disagree; the language of contract is itself a useful locus of debate. 
A contractual approach to close corporation law does not require courts 
to abandon minority shareholders to the explicit terms of their bargain, 
regardless of whether those terms are consistent with the parties’ reasonable 
expectations.  If the corporation is a contract, it is a relational contract 
intended to endure over time and not a discrete, bargained-for exchange.  
Indeed, judicial protection of vulnerable minority shareholders conflicts 
 
 293. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 253 (“Small firms may prefer the comfort of 
corporate restrictions on opting out of fiduciary duty and mandatory remedies for majority 
shareholder oppression.”). 
 294. Cf. JOHN SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY 32 (1998) (noting that certain 
propositions cannot meaningfully be debated, because any discussion presupposes their 
existence).  For instance, “you can’t . . . settle the issue about the existence of the real world, 
because any such settling presupposes the existence of the real world.” Id.  Thus, “realism is 
not a theory at all but the framework within which it is possible to have theories.” Id.  By 
contrast, we can and should choose intelligently among the available frameworks for 
understanding shareholder relationships in close corporations.  The standard law and 
economics framework may cause certain choices to appear inevitable once applied, but the 
framework itself can be challenged. 
 295. In many respects, the terms of the debate over shareholder remedies have remained 
unchanged since the earliest exchange of views. Compare EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra 
note 1 (defending the standard law and economics perspective), with J.A.C. Hetherington & 
Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation:  A Proposed Statutory Solution to the 
Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977) (supporting minority 
shareholder oppression remedies, including a right of exit). 
 296. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 31. 
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with private ordering only if we assume the artificially rational world of 
standard economics.  But shareholders live in the real world, not in the 
pages of a game theory treatise, and the ties of family and friendship, the 
social norms of business, and the constraints imposed by transaction costs 
all impact the likelihood that the parties will negotiate adequate protections 
against possible future discord. 
 
